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Of Katz and "Aliens":
Privacy Expectations and the
Immigration Raids
Raquel Aldana ·
This Article examines privacy rights for non citizens in the context of the
recent immigration raids in peoples ' homes and the workplace . The
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office is conducting these raids
with general or defective warrants and executes them in a discriminating
dragnet-style, mostly against Latinos . The Fourth Amendment, however,
provides little protection to immigrants and their families . This Article
explores how law's construction of immigrants' illegality interplays with
Fourth Amendment doctrines of consent, reasonable expectation of
privacy, pretextual stops, and administrative searches to deny immigrants
privacy's protection.
In addition , the Article explores the spread of
immigration databases and the proliferation of federal and local
regulation of spaces occupied by immigrants within the border to examine
the legal justifications for these generalized and defective warrants. The
Article concludes by urging courts to reconsider reliance on immigrants'
unlawful presence in the U.S. to excuse law enforcement abuses and offers
several legal and policy reasons in favor of privacy protection for
noncitizens .
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INTRODU CTION

Immigrants and their families across the United States live in fear as
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents raid their
neighborhoods, shopping centers, worksites, and homes in a
nationwide hunt targeting millions of undocumented persons. 1 In the
last two years, during which raids have intensified, ICE has rounded
up tens of thousands of persons, detained them, charged hundreds
with immigration crimes, and returned most to their countries of
origin. 2 These raids wreak havoc on families and communities as
children are left without parents and communities without workers. 3
These raids are taking place when the United States as a nation is
fiercely divided on how to address the presence and future flow of
millions of unauthorized immigrants .4 Because the raids seek to
enforce U.S. immigration laws against persons who broke the law
through unauthorized entry or overdue stays into the United States,
some see the raids as neither illegal nor immoral. Especially to
persons who view undocumented immigration as the cause of U.S.
economic and social ills, ICE is finally doing its job of repairing the
consequences of a porous border, including loss of jobs, increased
crime, and the rising costs of public spending. 5
The counterstory to anti-immigrant sentiment is vastly different and
challenges the legality and morality of U.S. immigration policy. The
thorny history of the United States-Mexico border reconfiguration at
the turn of the century and noncompliance with the Treaty of

1
The Associated Press, High Profile Raids Leave Immigrants Across U.S. Living in
Fear, INT'L HERALDTRIB., Feb. 20, 2007 , available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2007/02/21/america/NA-GEN-US-Immigration-Raids-Fear.php.
2
See infra Part I.
3
See infra Pan II.
4
A December 2006 Washington Post-ABC News Poll reveals that 29% of
respondents called immigration bad and the same number called it good. About 39%
said it makes no difference. Anthony Faiola, Looking the Other Way on Immigrants:
Some Cities Buck Federal Policies, WASH.POST, Apr. 10, 2007 , at Al.
5
See, e.g., Steven A. Camarata, Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Use Enforcement to
(Oct.
23,
2005),
http://www.thinkaz.org/documents/
Ease
Situation
Useenforcementtoeasesituation_OOO .pdf (urging OHS to adopt policy of immigration
attrition through enforcement, that is, forcing immigrants out by making United
States less hospitable).
See generally Center for Immigration Studies , Illegal
Immigration , http://www.cis .org/topics/illegalimmigration.html
(last visited Dec. 19,
2007) (containing links to several articles discussing social ills created by
undocumented migration) .
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Guadalupe-Hidalgo is part of this narrative .6 Further, an explanation
of mass migration, particularly from Latin America into the United
States, rooted in U.S. foreign and economic policies with sending
nations, shifts the lens away from the individual agency of the
immigrant toward a more complex story of responsibility of U.S.
multinationals and employers who cause and profit from mass
migration. 7 The complicit factors of under-enforced immigration law
and economic gain to U.S. employers and consumers have allowed the
creation of immigrant communities, which are now at stake. 8 The
human rights angle of the story thus emphasizes the stakes of family,
property, and community.
The prominence of the immigration issue in public discourse in
2007 forced Congress to seriously consider comprehensive
Ultimately,
Congress did not act.
immigration
reform. 9
Consequently, undocumented
immigrants' hope of a path to
legalization probably will have to wait until after the 2008 presidential
election. 10 In the meantime, immigration raids have intensified and
become a political battleground for anti-immigrant sentiment. Since
2002, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has made insidethe-border enforcement of immigration a priority, particularly
targeting undocumented workers, incarcerated immigrants, suspected
gang members, and persons with a final order of removal. 11

6

See RICHARDGRISWOLDDELCASTILLO,THE TREATYOF GUADALUPE-HIDALGO
: A
LEGACY
OF CONFLICT173 (1990).
7 Consider agriculture, for example.
The United States ' annual farm subsidies,
combined with free trade agreements with most Latin American nations and a cheap
supply of foreign agricultural workers on U.S. farms, have slowed down farm
production in Latin America, displaced farmers from their homes and into the U.1ited
States, and increased produce importation and profits for U.S. farmers. See, e.g., Bert
R. Pena & Amy Henderson, U.5.-Mexico Agricultural Trade and Investment After
NAFTA, 1 U.5.-MEX. L.J.259, 275 (1993); Calvin Terbeek, Comment, Love in the Time
of Free Trade: NAFTA's Economic Effects Ten Years Later, 12 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP.L.
487 , 504-07 (2004).
8 See generally BILLONG HING, DEPORTI
NG OUR SOULS
: VALUES,MORALITY
, AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY8-51 (2006).
9
Robert Pear & Jim Rutenberg, Senators in Bipartisan Deal on Immigration Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18 , 2007 , at Al ; Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill Introduced in
NG AHEADWITHSAULEWING: IMMlGR.REFORMBILL
U.S. House of Representatives, STAYI
BULL.1 (Saul Ewing LLP, Del., Md ., N.j., Pa ., D.C.), Mar. 2007 , at 1-2, available at
http://www.saul.com/common/publications/pdf_l263
.pdf.
10
Gail Russell Chaddock & Faye Bowers , Immigration Bill Stalls Amid Calls for
SCI. MONITOR,june 29, 2007 , at 1.
'Enforcement First,' CHRISTIAN
11
See infra Part II.
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In this battle, not unlike the "war on drugs," which
disproportionately targeted blacks, 12 a casualty has been noncitizens'
Fourth Amendment rights. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared that the Fourth Amendment applied to immigration
enforcement, even if with increased tolerance for racial profiling. 13
However, as discussed in this Article, through a subsequent series of
sweeping decisions, the Fourth Amendment has become moribund,
barely able to grant any privacy protections to noncitizens, particularly
in the realm of immigration enforcement.
One significant explanation
for this Fourth Amendment
exceptionalism is the Court 's early treatment of immigration as a
matter of civil as opposed to criminal enforcement. 14
The
characterization of immigration enforcement as administrative has
colored the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. In particular,
by characterizing removal proceedings as nonpenal, the Court has,
since 1984, precluded the Fourth Amendment 's exclusionary remedy,
except within the narrow "egregious violations" exception . 15
Moreover, the applka tion of the consent doctrine in immigration
enforcement under the most coercive circumstances increasingly
defies the fictional premise that reasonable people feel free to walk
away from law enforcement encounters. In immigration encounters,
Fourth Amendment doctrine assumes the reasonable person is free to
refuse questions of immigration agents at immigration checkpoints. 16
That same assumption applies during unannounced workplace raids
conducted by dozens of armed immigration agents, some of whom
question workers while others guard the exits ;17 or even during the
execution of administrative warrants in a person 's home while she is
handcuffed for more than two hours .18 The resulting picture is that

12
See Olatunde C.A. Johnson , Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 406
(2007); Dorothy E. Roberts , The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1301 (2004); David Rudovsky , The
Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U . CHI.
LEGALF. 237, 239 .
13 See United States v. Martinez-Fuert e, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
14
See Daniel Kanstroom , Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Mahe Bad Cases, 113 HARV.L. REV.1889, 1894 (2000).
15
INS v. Lop ez- Mendoza , 468 U.S. 1032 , 1050 (1984); Joseph ]. Migas ,
Exclusionary Remedy Available in Civil Deportation Proceedingsfor Egregious Fourth
Amendment Violations, 9 GEO.IMMIGR.L.J. 207 , 209 (1995).
16
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
17
INS v. Delgado , 466 U.S. 210 , 218 (1984).
18
Muehler v. Mean , 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005).
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when immigration agents target immigrants inside the border, the
Fourth Amendment
offers little protection.
Immigrants
are
unprotected either because the exclusionary rule has no application in
removal proceedings, or even when the exclusionary rule applies, as in
criminal proceedings,
most of those encounters
are deemed
nonseizures and nonsearches.
But what if this "reasonable" noncitizen learns to walk away from
the immigration agent and refuses to answer his questions? This is a
likely scenario because immigrant rights groups advise their clients to
maintain a code of silence when they encounter "la migra." 19 Would
immigrants then have a privacy expectation to refuse questions and
even to walk away from ICE? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be
no. Except in very limited circumstances, ICE is conducting this latest
wave of raids with easy access to civil warrants in a way that expands
the scope of its law enforcement power, compelling mandatory
compliance .
Today, DHS's regulatory arm reaches into employer hiring
practices, 20 university requirements
for foreign students, 21 the
government's distribution of public benefits, 22 and driver's licenses, 23
among other areas. In turn , this preoccupation has caused the
proliferation of databases that, in most cases, grant ICE easy access to
information about a person's immigration status as a worker, 24
student, 25 or driver. 26 With easy access to such information in these

19

See Anna Gorman, Immigrants Advised About Their Rights, L.A. TIMES, Mar . 4,
2007, at Bl.
20
See infra Part I.A.
21
See Michael A. Olivas , IIRIRA, The Dream Act, and UndocumentedCollege Student
Residency, 25 lMMIGR.& NAT'LITYL. REV. 323 , 325 (2004) (discussing immigration
laws ' regulation of foreign students) ; Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment
Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the
United States, 29 VT. L. REV.407, 445, 455-56, 461-64 (2005).
22
Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens' Access to Public Benefits:
Flawed Premise, UnnecessaryResponse, 42 UCLA L. REV. 14 75, 14 76 (1995); Bill Ong
Hing, Don't Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and Welfare
Reform, 33 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 159 (1998).
23
Raquel Aldana & Sylvia Lazos , "Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9/I I: Legislating
OutsidernessWithin the Borders, 38 UC DAVISL. REV. 1683, 1711-22 (2005).
24
See infra Part I.A .
25
Victor C. Romero , Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post-9/11, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR.L.J. 357 , 361 (2003) (describing adoption and implementation of Student and
Exchange Visitor Information Service (SEVIS) database, which tracks foreign student
compliance with visa conditions) .
26
See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 180, 189 (2005)
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databases, ICE can arm itself with civil warrants even where there is
no particularized probable cause , to conduct raids in private or quasiprivate spaces without having to seek the information directly from
immigrants themselves. These warrants name no suspects. Rather,
they are issued precisely to allow ICE to identify and arrest persons for
removal or to charge them for criminal immigration violations.
Indeed , ICE agents have employed this strategy in the latest wave of
workplace raids. 27
Moreover, ICE has easy access to more than 600,000 civil warrants
to enforce against persons with prior removal orders who are labeled
absconders or fugitives and who appear in their outdated databases .28
While such "absconder warrants " target a particular suspect , their
execution is no different than the indiscriminate targeting of
immigrants that occurs in workplace raids. For example , despite the
fact that the target often no longer lives at the address that appears in
the database, no oversight occurs to protect third parties from privacy
invasions. Not surprisingly then, ICE strategically enforces these
warrants in people's homes to arrest as many persons who may be in
the country without authorization , often relying on racial profiling
and intimidating tactics in the process .29
In addition, inside-the-border enforcement is now occurring with
the collaboration of local law enforcement , not only in places such as
prisons, but also in routine traffic enforcement and other policing .30
More disturbing , however , is the proliferation of local anti-immigrant
ordinances that make it illegal for undocumented immigrants to loiter
in public spaces, occupy housing, procure employment, or conduct
business transactions .3 1 These ordinances could also expand the
(describing that immigration violations , including persons holding expired visas and
persons who did not compl y with removal orders , are now listed in National Crime
Information Center ("NCIC" ) database , which is available to squad cars enforcing
traffic laws).
27
See infra Part I.A.
28
See infra Part J.B.
29

3

Id.

° Kobach , supra note

26, at 197-99 ; see also Michael Hethmon, The Chimera and
the Cop: Local Enforcementof Federal Immigration Law, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83, 89 (2004);
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local PoliceEnforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA.J.
CONST. L. 1084 , 1085 (2004) . But see Orde F. Kittrie , Federalism, Deportation, and
Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1463-80 (2006 )
(discussing local sanctuary policies that protect immigrants seeking police assistance
from federal immigration enforcement ); Huyen Pham , The Constitutional Right Not to
Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1373, 1381-84 (2006).
31
See Raquel Aldana , On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the "Alien," 46 WASHBURN
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administrative policing arm of local law enforcement against
noncitizens not just in public, but also into quasi-private spaces, such
as workplaces, and even into private spaces, such as homes. Further,
these ordinances may encourage the proliferation of databases and
database information sharing to assist law enforcement in identifying
immigration violations for reporting them to ICE. Subsequently, like
the use of housing and zoning ordinances to police the poor, 32 the
traditionally private spaces that persons occupy would become so
heavily regulated by immigration restrictions that local police, like
ICE, might be able to easily obtain civil warrants to arrest immigrants
in the workplace, businesses, or universities, or even in private homes
without probable cause .33
These civil immigration warrants are neither very different from nor
less offensive to liberty values than the general warrants that originally
inspired the Fourth Amendment.
The infamous general search
warrants in early U.S. history were issued by executives and
legislators, without judicial intervention, with neither a probable cause
requirement or oath, nor a description of the particular places to be
searched and persons or things to be seized .34 Today, immigration
laws and codes authorize the compelled collection of information on
ever-expanding databases over which persons retain no expectation of
privacy and that become the basis for the issuance of warrants.
Moreover, the Camara 35 legacy of balancing government regulatory
powers against individual liberty interests 36 has validated the use of
indiscriminate warrants to conduct immigration raids for decades .37
L.J. 263 , 284 (2007); Michael ). Almonte , Note, State and Local Law Enforcement
Response to Undocumented Immigrants : Can We Make Rules Too?, 72 BROOK.L. REV.
655, 671-78 (2007).
32
See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Space: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows , and Public-Space Zoning , 105 YALEL.J. 1165 , 1202-19 (1996)
(surveying efforts to control homeless in public spaces) ; Nicole Stelle Garnett ,
Relocating Disorder , 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1088-98 (2005); Lorne Sossin, The
Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless : Notes on the Possibilities and Limits
of Bureaucratic Engagement , 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE623 , 640-46 (1996).
33
See infra Part J.C.
34
Geoffre y G. Hemphill , The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly
What the Framers Were Trying to Avoid? , 5 REGENTU. L. REV. 215 , 218-20 (1995).
35
Camara v. S.F. Mun . Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 536 (1967).
36
See Scott E. Sundby , A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics : Undoing the Mischief
of Camara and Terry , 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 , 392 (1988) .
37
Int '! Molders ' & Allied Workers ' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson , 799 F.2d 547 ,
553 (9th Cir. 1986) (agreeing with D.C. Circuit that immigrant workplace warrants
require only reasonable belief unauthorized workers may be present and not that each
be particularly named) ; Blackie's House of Beef, Inc . v. Castillo , 659 F.2d 1211 , 1213
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The principle mischief of the Fourth Amendment balancing doctrine is
that it has redefined the probable cause requirement as one of a
flexible inquiry of reasonableness, rather than requiring probable
cause to fulfill the prerequisite of reasonableness. 38
Judicial
preapproval becomes a mere procedural formality when warrants do
not require particularized suspicion based on probable cause.
In the immigration context particularly, the Fourth Amendment
scale has tilted heavily in favor of the state. The trend toward
eliminating noncitizens ' expectations of privacy in the spaces they
occupy inside the border cannot be detached from the ongoing war
against undocumented migration. Local governments' interests in
protecting the economy or the federal government 's interest in
controlling immigration or national security weigh heavily against the
privacy interests of undocumented
immigrants to hide their
"illegality. " Increasingly, local and federal laws have sought to make
the mere presence of undocumented immigrants in U.S. spaces illegal ,
rendering them neither deserving nor reasonably expectant of
privacy's protection. 39 Like cars 40 or certain "heavily regulated "
businesses ,41 immigrants have become so regulated that any Katz 42
expectation of privacy to occupy spaces in silence without detection
becomes unreasonable.
Worse yet, im~igrants are treated like drugs or hazardous waste ,
which is precisely the imagery Justice Sandra Day O'Connor evoked in
1984 in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza to deny immigrants the exclusionary
rule as a remedy :
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering
corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the
evidence underlying the order had been improperly obtained,
or to compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs
to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized. 43
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding constitutionality of immigration workplace warrant
lacking particularized suspicion).
38
Sundby, supra note 36 , at 393-94 .
39
See infra Part I.
40 David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66
GEO. WA SH. L REV. 556 , 556 (1998).
41
Hemphill , supra note 34, at 233-37 ; Lynn S. Searle, Note, The "Administrative"
Search from Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HA STINGS CO NST.
L.Q. 261 , 273-88 (1989).
42
Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 353 (1967 ).
43
468 U.S. 1032 , 1046 (1984) .
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Thus, despite violation of their privacy by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS"), immigrant workers can still be seized
and discarded because of their illegality.
Paraphrasing Justice
Benjamin Cardozo's famous quote, Justice O'Connor concludes: "The
constable's blunder may allow the criminal go free ... but he should
not go free within our borders ."44
The latest example of denying undocumented immigrants all
expectation of privacy occurred in February 2007 when the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DO]") announced a plan to collect DNA
evidence from all undocumented persons arrested for any reason to
include in the DNA database. 4s Before the announcement, DNA
evidence had been collected solely from convicted felons, 46 a practice
that perpetually erases any privacy expectations. Congress authorized
this ample expansion of power in a largely unnoticed amendment 47 to
the January 2006 renewal of the Violence Against Women Act,48
purportedly to protect victims of sexual crimes. 49 The FBI anticipates
that this new law would mean an increase of as many as 250,000 to
one million new DNA samples per year.so
In this Article, I analyze the privacy implications of ICE's recent
workplace and home raids. I also examine the further erosion of
privacy expectations for noncitizens through the local regulation of
the spaces they occupy in this country. I focus specifically on the
town of Hazleton's anti-immigrant ordinances restricting housing for
undocumented immigrants. s1 On July 26, 2007, U.S. Federal District
Court Judge James Munley of Pennsylvania struck down Hazleton's
ordinances based on due process concerns and federal preemption in
immigration matters.s 2 This ruling will halt, at least temporarily,
Hazleton 's implementation of the ordinances and may stall hundreds
of other towns from implementing similar measures.s 3 However,
44

Id. at 1047.
Julia Preston , U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2007, at Al.
46 Id.
4 7 Id.
48
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005 §§ 1003-1004, Pub. L No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085-86 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3142 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1435(a) (2000)).
49
Preston , supra note 45.
50 Id.
51
See infra Part J.C.
52
Lozano v. City of Hazleton , 496 F. Supp. 2d 477,554 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
53
Peter Elstrom , Small-Town Quarrel, Big Implications, Bus. WK., July 26, 2007 ,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2007/
45
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Hazleton 's mayor, Louis Barletta , vowed to appeal the case all the way
to the U.S. Supreme Court , if necessary .54 This issue , then , is not
disappearing anytime soon , and its privacy implications remain
relevant.
Through these case studies , I reveal the trend to construct a Katz
doctrine that excludes or undermines the expectation of privacy of
noncitizens in a bounded construction of nationality to the detriment
of the Fourth Amendment. In this construct , law enforcement abuses
of power are tolerated, ignored , or worse yet , rationalized through law,
on the faulty premise that "privacy " should not allow "illegality" to
hide . The origins of the Fourth Amendment , however , dictate
otherwise. The King of England 's aim for general warrants was to find
and arrest those who refused to pay legally mandated taxes .55
Trumping the legitimacy of the King's laws, and today , immigration
laws, the Fourth Amendment 's purpose has always been to limit the
state 's abuses of privacy.
Immigration raid abuses include the issuance of civil warrants that
are not substantiated on particularized probable cause . Instead, the
warrants are often issued based on flawed information contained in
database s whose information was never intended to have a law
enforcement purpose. 56 These abuses also include the dragnet-like
and intimidating execution of warrants in people 's homes and in the
workplace with devastating effects on families and communities. 57
Still more abuses include the racially charged nature that has always
characterized immigration law enforcement. 58 Yet, courts have mostly
turned a blind eye to these abuses by pretending that removal is not
punishment, ignoring the fact that raids carry criminal consequences
for many, or, worse yet , allowing the "illegality " of those arrested to
justify law enforcement's wrongdoing .

db20070726_2645 l 2.htm .
54 Id.
55
Thomas K. Clancy , The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UT AH L. REV . 977 , 981-82 ; see also Scott E. Sundby , Protectingthe Citizen "Whilst He Is
Quiet": SuspicionlessSearches, "Special Needs" and GeneralWarrants , 74 Mrss. L.j. 501,
506-08 (2004 ) (noting that colonies had their own form of general warrants through
writs of assistance authorizing customs officials to search for untaxed imported
goods ).
56
See infra Part I.
57
See infra Part I.
58 Kevin R. Johnson , Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 28 H UM. Rrs. 23,
23 (2001 ) .
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THE RAIDS' MODUS OPERANDI

"Operation Wagon Train" and the Swift & Co. Workplace Raids

In December 2006 , ICE agents, armed with civil search warrants
procured by the DOJ and dressed in riot gear, stormed six Swift&: Co.
meatpacking plants in various cities to carry out Operation Wagon
Train. 59 According to ICE, an investigation lasting ten months
uncovered substantial evidence of Swift workers using stolen identities
of U.S. citizens, namely their Social Security numbers ("SSNs") and
dates of birth .60 The investigation began when former Swift workers,
who had been arrested for other violations , admitted to using other
people's SSNs to procure employment at Swift&: Co. 61 Tips also came
from anonymous calls to ICE and by local police referrals .62
The civil warrants allowed ICE agents to search for and apprehend
any undocumented worker encountered during those raids. 63 In order
to identify those workers not authorized to work, ICE conducted onsite interviews of all employees, including legal residents and U.S.
citizens. 64 ICE claims it did not prevent any workers from leaving the
area during the interviews . Moreover, ICE claims that its agents did
not frisk employees and limited interview questions to ascertaining the
worker's immigration status, allowing them to make calls to family
members if they needed to go home to verify their work eligibility .65
The workers, however, tell a much different story. At one plant, for
example, workers describe that early in the morning several buses
arrived with dozens of heavily armed federal agents accompanied by
59 Press Release , Dep't of Homeland Security, Remarks by Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff , Immigration and Customs Enforcement Assistant Secretary
Julie Myers, and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras at a
Press Conference on Operation Wagon Train (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_l 16604 7951514.shtm [hereinafter DHS Press
Release] ; see also Nicole Gaouette, Six Meat Plants Are Raided in Massive 1.D. Theft
Case; Swift & Co. Workers Are Accused of Immigration Violations and Using Stolen Social
Security Numbers, L.A. TIMES,Dec. 13, 2006 , at Al 8.
60
DHS Press Release, supra note 59.
61
Id. at 3.
62 Id.
63 On December 8, 2006, ICE "applied for and was granted a civil administrative
warrant by U.S. District Court Judge Figa." Respondent 's Memorandum of Law in
Response to the Order to Show Cause at 2, Yarrito v. Myers , No. 06-CV-2494-JLKMJW (D. Colo . Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ailf.org!ladclearinghouse_
122106_Dresponse .pdf [hereinafter Respondent 's Memorandum of Law].
64
Id. at 3-4 .
6s Id.
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local police dressed in riot gear. While some ICE agents blocked all
the entrances and exits and surrounded the factory, others entered the
factory and gathered the entire workforce. 66 Some workers who tried
to run were wrestled to the ground. 67 Some workers even assert that
ICE agents responded with chemical sprays to subdue workers who
did not understand the agents' commands. 68
As a result of the raids, ICE arrested 1,282 workers on immigration
violations and some existing criminal warrants. 69 Most workers
arrested were placed in immigration removal proceedings. About 240
workers were charged criminally, mostly for the use of false or stolen
SSNs.70 The Swift & Co. raids are the largest worksite raid to date,
with the largest before that executed in April 2006 against a company
called IFCO Systems North America, during which 1,187 workers
were arrested. 71 As of July 2007, targeted arrests of Swift employees
have continued, whether documented or undocumented, based on
allegations of document fraud or harboring of undocumented
workers. 72
Immigration worksite raids have occurred for decades. 73 In the past,
complaints by government, employers, and civil rights groups of
economic disruption and violations of civil liberties had convinced
immigration officials to shift their efforts to immigration enforcement
Recently, however, the
near the border and at checkpoints. 74
landscape for worksite immigration enforcement has changed. In
2006, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made worksite enforcement a
priority, announcing in April 2006 a nationwide immigration

66

Marc Cooper, Lockdown in Greeley, NATION,Feb. 26, 2007, at 11.
Id.
68
Id.
69
OHS Press Release, supra note 59.
7
° Cooper , supra note 66, at 11; see also Julia Preston, Illegal Worker, Troubled
Citizen and Stolen Name, N .Y. TIMES,Mar. 22, 2007, at Al (reporting 148 workers were
charged with identity theft).
71
OHS Press Release , supra note 59.
72
Jean Hopfensperger, 2 Illegal Immigrants Seized at Swift's Worthington Plant:
Federal Officials Arrested 15 Other People at Swift & Co. Meatpacking Plans around the
Country as Part of an Investigation into ldCTitityTheft, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
July 12, 2007, at 4B.
73
Note, Reexamining the Constitutionality of INS Workplace Raids After the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 100 HARV.L. REV. 1979 , 1979 (1987); see
also Alfredo Mirande, Is There a "Mexican Exception" to the Fourth AmCTidment?
, 55
FLA.L. REV.365 , 370-72 (2003) (documenting case law involving workplace raids in
1970s).
74
See Gaouette , supra note 59.
61
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enforcement strategy that would aggressively target employers who
knowingly or recklessly hire undocumented workers .75
ICE's new worksite enforcement strategy, begun in eleven major
U .5. cities, adopts a comprehensive approach focusing on how
undocumented workers enter the country and obtain identity
documents, as well as targeting employers who knowingly hire such
workers. 76 As a result of this strategy, the number of persons arrested
in the workplace for being unable to prove legal immigration status
jumped nearly tenfold since 2002 to 4,385 in fiscal year 2006. 77
In addition, an increasing number of persons arrested during
workplace raids are criminally prosecuted and face felony criminal
charges with a real threat of jail time for violating immigration or
other U.S. laws principally related to identity theft. In 2006 , for
example, that number was 716 of the total arrests (sixteen percent),
up from only twenty-five in 2002 (five percent). 78 In fact, ICE today is
effectively, even if deceivingly, 79 appealing to identity theft concerns,
as well as to the image of foreigners as potential terrorists. This appeal
increases the level of tolerance for civil rights erosions, especially of

75
DHS reques ted $41 million in funds and 200 more ICE agents for fiscal year
2007 to implement a worksite enforcement strategy. Jerry Seper, Agents Raidj ob Sites
for Illegals, WASH.TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A3.
76
DHS Press Release, supra not e 59.
77
The following table illustrates the number of arrests arising from ICE raids in
worksite enforcement investigations . U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Fact Sheets: Worksite Enforcement (Oct. 15, 2007), http ://www .ice.gov/pi/ news/
factsheets/worksite.htm.

Fiscal Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
78

Criminal Arrests
25
72

160
176
716
863

Administrative Arrests
485
445
685
1,116
3,667
4,077

DHS Press Release, supra not e 59.
Chertoff mischaracterizes the und ocum ented workers ' use of fake SSNs or even
real ones (often inadvertently) because workers are not , for exampl e, running up
someone else's credit card bill or pushing someone into financial ruin. Rather, as
Mark Grey , director of the Iowa Center for Immigrant Leadership and Integration ,
describes , these workers are embroiled in "an elaborat e choreography among the
emp loyers who need the immigrant workers , the immigrants who want these jobs, the
comm uniti es who need them, the cattlemen who depend on them and the government
whose basic motto has been: Don't ask , don't tell. " Cooper, supra note 66, at 12.
79
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privacy interests. Consider, for example , Chertoffs remarks in defense
of worksite raids:
[Document fraud] is a serious problem not only with respect
to illegal immigration, but with respect to national security.
And that's precisely the point made by the 9/11 Commission a
couple of years ago, because illegal documents are not only
used by illegal migrants , but they are used by terrorists who
want to get on airplanes, or criminals who want to prey on our
citizens . And so, as part of this overall strategy of worksite
enforcement, we've gotten very focused on the question of
those who exploit illegal documents and identity theft in order
to pursue illegal acts. So yesterday's enforcement action [in
the Swift Co. raids] demonstrates another step in this work
site enforcement strategy. A tough stance against worksites
that employ illegal aliens and against individuals and
organizations that commit or facilitate identity theft or fraud.80
These workplace immigration raids are representative of Fourth
Amendment exceptionalism for immigrant workers in the United
States . It is not that the Fourth Amendment has no application in this
context, but rather that privacy expectations about immigration status
in the workplace have been eroded . Such erosion occurs through
statutes authorizing the creation of databases from which ICE has easy
access to obtain civil warrants to conduct raids without particularized
suspicion. Unions representing some of the workers arrested during
the Swift & Co. raids have filed complaints alleging, inter alia, Fourth
Amendment violations when ICE arrested a large group of workers
without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion. 81 The likely
success of the litigation, however, is quite narrow even for workers
who may have a remedy in criminal proceedings . Fourth Amendment

80

OHS Press Release, supra note 59.
Original Complaint - Class Action Request for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief and Damages at 8-10, 12-14, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'! Union
v. Chertoff, No. 07-00188 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007 ), available at
http://www.ailf.org/lac/UFood-Complaint.pdf
[her einafter Class Action Request]. In
addition, United Food and Commercial Workers Union filed a petition for habea s
corpus and comp laint for declaratory relief based on ICE's due process violations in
conducting the raids. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5-6, Yarrito v. Meyers,
No. 06-CV-2494 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www .ailf.org/lac/
clearinghouse_l22106_swifthabeas.pdf.
That case, however , was closed when the
distri ct court judge determined that ICE had sufficiently corrected any constitutional
deficienci es. Final Judgment at 1, Yarrito, No. 06-CV-2494 (D. Colo. Jan . 25, 2007) ,
available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/clearinghouse_l22106_yarrito.pdf.
81
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violations will be difficult to establish under current Fourth
Amendment doctrine .
The threshold for a Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy in a worker's immigration status is likely quite
high in light of the heavily regulated nature of workplace immigration
enforcement that allows unregulated databases, compels employer
"collaboration," and sanctions general warrants.
1.

On IRCA, Databases, and Employer "Collaboration"

With the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 ("IRCA"), 82 employers are required to have their employees
complete a government-issued Employment Eligibility Verification
Form ("Form 1-9") to establish that the employee is authorized to
work in the United States .83 The employee must complete and sign
Form 1-9 and present work authorization
and identification
documents, which employers must examine, copy, and retain for three
years after the date of hire or one year after employment ends,
whichever comes later. 84 The accepted documents that establish work
authorization include a U.S. passport , social security card, or DHSissued immigration documents such as a permanent residency card or
a work authorization card, while identity documents are mostly U.S.issued and include driver licenses and voter or military identification
cards. 85 Employers retain these documents expressly to enforce the
immigration restncnons
on unauthorized
employment
against
employers and workers in the workplace. 86
To this end , Congress created the Basic Pilot Employment
Verification Project ("Basic Pilot"), an electronic employment
eligibility verification program, initially to operate in a few states. 87
82
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub . L. No. 99-603 , 100 Stat.
3359, 3359 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
83
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1990 , § 8 U.S.C. 1324a (b) (2000); 8
C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2000); see also NAT'LEMPLOYMENT
LAW PROJECT,EMPLOYM
ENT WORK
AUTHORIZATION
VERIFICATION: FACT SHEET FOR WORKER
S (2002 ), available at
http://www.nelp .org/docUploads/publ 4 7%2Epdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet for Workers].
84
8 C.F.R. § 274a .2(b )( 2) .
85 Id. § 274a.2 (b )(l)(v)(A)-(
B) .
86
Id.§ 274a.2(b )( 4) .
87
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 , §
401 (b), Pub . L. No. 104-208 , 110 Stat. 3009 , 3009-655 to 3009-656. The original
states included California , Florida, Illinois , New York, and Texas, and extended in
1999 to cover Nebraska . "Basic Pilot" Employment Eligibility Verification Program
Expanded Nationwide, IMMIGRANTS'RTS. UPDATE(Nat'! Immigration Law Ctr., L.A.,
Cal.), Dec. 22 , 2004 , available at http:/ /www. nilc .org/immsemplyrnnt/ir caempverifl
irca060 .htm .
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Created in 1996, Basic Pilot permits employers to match employee
Form I-9s against U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
("CIS") and Social Security Administration ("SSA") databases for
verification. 88 Congress set forth a limited list of employers required
to participate in Basic Pilot. This included federal employers and
other employers that an administrative law judge has required to
participate as part of a cease and desist order issued under 8 U.S.C. §
1324a ("Unlawful Employment of Aliens .") 89
Congress also
specifically provided, however, that the government "may not require
any person or other entity to participate in a pilot program. "90
Through Basic Pilot, employers should be able to detect false or
made-up SSNs or those whose names and numbers do not match.
Both the immigration and SSA databases are notoriously inaccurate ,
however, and significantly undermine Basic Pilot's utility .91 In 2002,
DHS hired Temple University and Westat to conduct an independent
evaluation of Basic Pilot. The team identified several problems and
recommended against larger-scale implementation .92 These problems
included CIS's failure to provide timely data ; employer misuse of the
database to prescreen applicants seeking employment; adverse
employer action against workers who receive a tentative
nonconfirmation in .the first phase of verification; and employer failure
to institute appropriate privacy safeguards. 93
Nevertheless , Congress expanded employer use of Basic Pilot in
2003 to operate in all fifty states, subject to review and monitoring. 94

88
NAT'L IMMlGRATION LAW CTR., BASIC INFORMAT
ION BRIEF: OHS BASIC PILOT
PROGRAM 3 (rev. Mar. 2007), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/
ircaempverif/basicpilot_infobrief_brief_2007-03-2
l. pdf.
89
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon sib ility Act of 1996 § 402(e).
90
Id. § 402(a).
91
The SSA its elf estimates that 17 .8 million of its records contain discrepancies
related to name, date of birth, or citizenship status. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTORGEN.,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSEREPORT: ACCURACYOF THESOCIALSECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'SNUMIDENT FILE, at ii (2006), available at http ://www.ssa.gov/
oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-06-26100.pdf.
The same report also notes that 4.8 million of
the approximately
46. 5 milli on n o ncitiz en records contained in the SSA's databas e
contain dis cre pan cies. Id. at 11. The GAO also found that over 111,000 alien files
were lo st. Gov 'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, IMMIGRATlONBENEFITS:ADDITlONALEFFORTS
NEEDEDTO HELP ENSUREALIENFILESARELOCATEDWHEN NEEDED4 (2006) , available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0785.pdf.
92
TEMPLE UNIV. INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT
EVALUATIO
N SUMMARY REPORT 41 (2002) , avai lable at http ://www .nilc .org/
immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/basicpiloteval_
wes tat&t emple. pdf.
93
Id. at 41-42.
94
Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156,
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In 2004, DHS submitted a report to Congress to address the concerns
outlined in the Temple/Westat report. This report noted that SSA's
databases are currently able to automatically verify employment
eligibility of less than fifty percent of the work-authorized noncitizens
and recommended against expanding Basic Pilot into a large-scale
national program until DHS and SSA addressed the databases'
inaccuracies. 95 Basic Pilot, moreover, is unable to detect fraud when
workers have appropriated another person's valid identification and
Despite these shortcomings,
work authorization
documents. 96
approximately 12,000 employers across the United States today use
Basic Pilot. 97
Meanwhile, in July 2006, DHS instituted a program called ICE
Mutual Agreement between Government and Employer ("IMAGE"), a
collaborative agreement between government and businesses to reduce
the hiring of undocumented workers. 98 For some companies, joining
IMAGE, particularly after what happened to Swift & Co., is a way of
avoiding ICE raids. 99 Under the program, businesses receive training
on and must adhere to a series of "best practices," including using
Basic Pilot, arranging for annual Form 1-9 external audits, and
establishing a procedure for reporting any violations or deficiencies to
ICE. 10° Companies in compliance become "IMAGE certified," an
industry standard that ICE believes will become common. 101
Companies participating in the program have already yielded results

117 Stat. 1944, 1944.
95
U.S. CITIZENSHIP&:
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,REPORTTO CONGRESS
ONTHEBASlCPILOT
available at
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/
PROGRAMS 4-5
(2004),
ircaempverif/basicpilot_uscis_rprt_to_congress_2004-06.pdf;
see
also
Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT:
WEAKNESSES
HINDEREMPLOYER
VERIFICATIONAND WORKSITEENFORCEMENTEFFORTS 5-6 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d058l3.pdf.
96
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,supra note 95, at 6.
97
NAT'L IMMIGRATION
LAW CTR.,THEBASICPILOTPROGRAM:
NOTA MAGICBTJLLET1
(rev. ed . Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.nilc.org!immsemplymnt/
ircaempveriVe-verify _nomagicbullet_2007-09- l 7.pdf.
98
Stinson, Morrison, Hecker LLP, A New "IMAGE" for Immigration Compliance
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.lawatwork.com/news/2006/08/02/a_new
_image_for_
immigration_compliance.html.
99
Darryl Fears &: Krissah Williams, In Exchange for Records, Fewer Immigration
Raids: Businesses Skeptical of New Federal Program, WASH.PosT, Jan. 29, 2007 , at A03.
JOO Id.
101
Press Release, ICE, OHS Highlights Best Practices for Maintaining Legal
Workforces: Unveils new industry partnership to help businesses make good hiring
decisions Quly 26 , 2006), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/
articles/060726dc.htm.
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for ICE. For example, ICE arrested several employees at the
Smithfield Packing Company's hog slaughterhouse after the company
handed over employee records to ICE in compliance with the IMAGE
program. 102
Additionally, the SSA has been sending so-called No-Match letters,
about 130,000 every year, 103 which provide employers with a list of
employees whose names or SSNs on their Wage and Tax Statement
(Form W-2) do not match SSA records. 104 The SSA's stated purpose
for this letter is to correct errors in its database, not to provide
employers grounds for firing an employee or reporting him to
immigration authorities. 105 However, some employers fire employees
or report them to ICE out of fear that not doing so could make them
liable for knowingly hiring undocumented workers or subject to IRS
fines. 106
In reality, employers face neither IRS107 nor !RCA liability when they
receive SSA No-Match letters .108 However, in June 2006, ICE issued
proposed rules regarding an employer 's legal obligations upon
receiving a No-Match letter. 109 The rule would allow ICE to use an
employer 's failure to act after receipt of these letters as evidence that
the employer had "constructive knowledge" of an employee's work
ineligibility. 110 Under the proposed rules , an employer must fire a
102
Fears & Williams , supra note 99. As of January 2007 , 541 of the 5000 Smithfield
employees faced the prospect of job termination or arrest based on document
discrepancies detected in their job applications through company audits. Id.
103
N.C. Aizenman , Bush Moves to Step Up Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 2007 , at Al.
10
• Fact Sheet for Workers, supra note 83 .
IOS See Soc. SEC. ADMIN
., RETIREME
NT, SURVIVORS,AND DISABILITY
INSURANCE:
REQUESTFOR EMPLOY
ER INFORMA
TION 1 (2004), available at http ://policy.ssa.gov/
poms .nsf/lnx/0101199028?opendocument ; see also Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIA
L SECURITY
NUMBER VERIFICATIONSERVI
CE HANDBOOK 19 (rev. ed. 2007) , available ac
http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnvs_handbk.htm.
106
See Lee Sustar , Feds Greenlight Firing of Immigrant Workers: BossesTake Aim at
the Undocumented, COUNTER-PUNCH, Sept. 15, 2006 , http ://www.counterpunch .org/
sustar09152006 .html.
107
Letter from Thomas B. Dobbins , Dir ., P'ship Outreach, IRS, to Michael O'Neill
and Connie Davis, Info . Reporting Program Advisory Comm . (Sept. 24, 2003) (on file
with author ).
ios NAT'LEMPLOYMENT
LAW PROJE
CT, SSA "No MATCH
" LETTERS:TOP TEN TIPS FOR
EMPLOYER
S 1-2 (2006 ), available at http://www.nelp .org/docUploads/top_ten _
tip2009060final. pdf.
109
NAT'LIMMIGRA
TION LAW CTR.,SUMMARY
OF OHS-PROPOSED
RULE
S: "SAFEHARBOR
PROCEDURES
FOREMPLOYERS
WHORECEIVE A No-MATCHLETTER
" 1 (2006), available at
http://www .nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ssa_related_info/ssanomatch_fedregs_summary.pdf.
110

Id.
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worker with a No-Match SSA letter if within ninety days that worker
has failed to rectify the mistake. 111 Failure to do so could lead to stiff
civil sanctions, $10,000 per violation, or prosecution. 112 On August
10, 2007, Secretary Chertoff and Commerce Secretary Carlos M.
Gutierrez in a joint press conference presented a new immigration
enforcement plan that includes the new SSA No-Match rule, which
took effect in September 2007. 113 This move is very likely to provoke
employers to fire even more, or report immediately to ICE, employees
identified in SSA No-Match letters. 114
Through Basic Pilot, IMAGE, and SSA No-Match letters, the federal
government has institutionalized
significant information sharing
between DHS and employers to facilitate immigration laws' workplace
enforcement. Essentially, IRCA delegated immigration oversight to
private employers. 115
2.

On ICE's Scope of Enforcement Powers

Given the degree of access to a company's employee records that
ICE currently enjoys, ICE's use of civil search warrants to raid the
meatpacking plants is not surprising. 116 Getting the civil warrants was
actually quite easy. Post-IRCA, employers have all the incentive to
cooperate with ICE in order to limit their own liability. Swift & Co.,
for example, participated in Basic Pilot for at least a decade before the

Ill
Perkins Coie, Feds Enforcing Stricter "No Match" Regulations on Employee Work
Documents (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?

publication=l 439&op=updates.
112

113

See id.
See id.

114
Press Release, Migration Policy Inst. , No-Match Letter Could Affect 1.5 Million
Workers (Oct. 2007) , available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org!pubs/BR5_
SocialSecurityNoMatch_101007.pdf.
On October 10, 2007, U.S. District Court Judge
Charles R. Breyer of the Northern District in California issued an injunctive order
against the regulation based on its conflict with the 1980 Regulatory Flexibility Act ,
and because the SSA databases ' discrepancies could result in the firing of lawfully
employed workers. Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Am. Fed 'n of
Labor, v. Chertoff, No. C 07-04472 CRB, 2007 WL 2972952, at *4-7, 11-13 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 10, 2007).
115
See generally Gillian E. Metzer, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Cot.UM.L. REV.
1367 (2003) (discussing trend to muddle private/public divide when government
privatizes public functions) .
116
ICE applied for and was granted a civil administrative search warrant by U.S.
District Court Judge Figa to assess the citizenship and immigration status of the Swift
employees on December 8, 2006 . See Respondent 's Memorandum of Law, supra note
63 , at 2.
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raids. 117 Moreover, DHS regulations on IRCA enforcement leave
employers that are subject to an investigation little room to refuse to
cooperate.
IRCA expressly authorized DHS access to examine
evidence of any person or entity under investigation for immigration
violations and to compel such participation by subpoena. 118
Moreover, IRCA mandated DHS to establish investigative procedures
to enforce IRCA, even when DHS received complaints from
individuals or entities. 119
In this case, ICE leads regarding possible identify theft by workers
employed at Swift & Co. initially came from interviews of former Swift
& Co. employees convicted for unrelated crimes. 120 Tips also came
from anonymous individuals who, pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 121 are able to report to ICE when they believe
undocumented workers have been employed. 122 Based on these
interviews, ICE allegedly discovered at least one "criminal ring " of
persons supplying Swift & Co. workers with genuine U.S. birth
certificates of individuals from Puerto Rico, as well as Social Security
cards. 123
Not surprisingly, in March 2006, ICE subpoenaed Swift & Co.
employee records as part of its investigation into the alleged ring of
SSN fraud connected to Swift & Co. workers. 124 Swift & Co. quickly
complied with ICE and allowed it to review the Form I-9s.125 Had
Swift & Co. refused, ICE had the statutory authority to seek
enforcement of the subpoena through a federal district court order. 126
Failure to comply with an ICE audit request or subpoena would also
likely have had even more adverse practical consequences for Swift &
Co., including raising ICE's suspicion of potential wrongdoing .
ICE's March 2006 subpoena request was for all Form I-9s and
supporting identity documents of all employees working at Swift's
plant in Marshalltown, Iowa . 127 In this initial request, Swift & Co.
117

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Swift & Co. v. ICE, No.
2-06CV-314-J (N.O. Tex. Nov. 28 , 2006) , available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/
clearinghouse_l22106_JCEcomplaint.pdf
[hereinafter Swift & Co. Complaint].
118
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(2)(C) (2000) .
119
Id. § 1324a(e)(l) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
120
OHS Press Release, supra note 59.
121
§ 1324a(e)(l).
122
DHS Press Release, supra note 59.
123 Id.
124
Swift & Co. Complaint, supra note 117, para. 5.
125
OHS Press Release, supra note 59.
126
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(2)(B) .
127
Swift & Co . Complaint , supra note 117, at 3.
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provided 1,300 records, 665 of which ICE retained for further
review . 128 In summer 2006, ICE issued similar subpoenas to the
company's six other plants across the United States . 129 In addition,
Swift &: Co. also conducted an internal audit of any suspect document
identified by ICE and identified a number of workers who , according
to Swift &: Co., "appear to have deliberately defeated the Basic Pilot
verification program ." 130 All of this readily available information
permitted ICE to establish grounds for the civil immigration warrants .
Notably , Swift&: Co. disagreed with ICE over the planned raids. In
their place , Swift &: Co . proposed a phased enforcement action that
would allow it to identify and incrementally dismiss unauthorized
workers from its plants. 131 In fact , Swift &: Co . initially responded to
the investigation without notifying ICE by interviewing approximately
450 suspect employees at several of its plants and found that ninety to
ninety-five percent were ineligible to work. 132 The result was that 400
of these workers were terminated , quit , or did not show up for the
scheduled interviews and were fired. 133 Swift &: Co. also sought an
injunction to stop the raids in late November 2006, arguing that the
raids would place an unnecessary financial and operational burden on
the company .134 The federal district court judge denied the relief ,
however, reasoning that an injunction would "harm the public 's
interest in quickly catching such criminals , swiftly breaking up any
rings which cause or contribute to [identify theft] harm, and minimize
continuing damages to innocent citizens ." 135
Swift &: Co.'s actions angered ICE because it now had no way of
knowing how to find those workers and remove them or criminally
charge them . Seizing on such examples, Chertoff faulted ICE's failure
to curb more SSN fraud on SSA's inability to refer all instances where
the same SSN is used on multiple occasions in multiple workplaces to
ICE. 136 As a result , Chertoff is now seeking to have direct access to the
SSA database, a move proscribed by statute: 137

128

Id.
Id.
130
Id. at 4.
131 Id.
132
Injunctiv e Ord er at 7, Swift & Co . v. ICE, No. 2:06CV-3 14-J (N. D. Tex . Dec. 7,
2006 ), available at http ://www.ailf. org/la d clearinghous e_l22106 _ctorder.pdf.
133 Id.
134
Swift & Co. Complaint , supra note 117, at 7-8.
135
Injun ctive Order , supra not e 132, at 9 .
136
OHS Press Release, supra not e 59.
137
See Privacy Act of 1974 , Pub . L 93-579, 88 Stat 1896 , 1897-99 (prot ecting data
129

2008]

OJKatz and "Aliens"

1103

If we were able to get the legal authority to do this kind of
review of information, we could much more readily identify
the kind of identity theft and identity fraud that we discovered
in this case . .. I call on Congress ... to take up this issue of
revising the Social Security rules so we can further protect
Americans from identity theft, and protect our borders against
illegal immigration .138

Already, there have been several proposals to grant DHS such
authority.
Senator Wayne Allard, Republican of Colorado, has
introduced legislation to authorize the SSA to share No-Match notices
with DHS.139
3.

Of General Warrants and the Swift&: Co. Raids

During the Swift &: Co. raids, ICE interviewed hundreds of present
workers and reviewed each employee's Form 1-9 records. 140 These
actions were authorized by the warrants. 141 Even prior to IRCA,
however, the courts had largely sanctioned similar questioning of
workers to ascertain immigration eligibility when immigration agents
possessed civil warrants lacking particularized suspicion. 142
At the end of the raids, ICE found thousands of SSNs that it believed
were being misused at Swift&: Co. ICE then turned the numbers over
to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC').
The FTC runs the
National Security Theft Clearinghouse ("Clearinghouse") and takes in
consumer complaints about identity theft that it shares with more than
1,400 law enforcement partners .143 The FTC ran these numbers
through the Clearinghouse and found that some identities were being
misused not only to procure employment, but also for credit card

from SSA use in absence of statute or regulation requiring verification of identity of
individual) .
138
DHS Press Release, supra note 59.
139
M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Bill Aims at Data Loophole: Immigration Raids Prompted
Allard Proposal, ROCKYMTN. NEWS, Mar. 1, 2007 , at 12.
140
Respondent 's Memorandum of Law, supra note 63 , at 3-4.
141
The Associated Press , 36 Arrested in Mishawaka Immigration Raid, Mar. 7, 2007 ,
available at http://www.thetimesonline.com/articles/2007 /03/07 /updates/breaking_
news/doc45eeel l 4b4138808006704.txt.
142
See Int '! Molders ' &: Allied Workers ' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d
547,547 (9 th Cir. 1986 ); Blackie's House ofBeef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1211
(D.C Cir. 1981)
143
DHS Press Release, supra note 59.
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fraud, student loan fraud, and tax evasion. 144 About the Swift & Co.
raids, Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras of the FTC remarked:
These arrests today demonstrate the power of interagency
coordination.
They show how enforcers from across the
government, working together, can uncover and stop a scheme
that harmed hundreds of U.S. citizens who simply were going
about their lives .
Despite such rhetoric, fewer than sixty-five of the 1,200 persons
arrested, about five percent, during the Swift & Co. raids were actually
charged with identity theft.
4.

Pretextual Raids

The sixty-five defendants facing criminal charges could challenge
their arrests and any evidence seized on the ground that ICE abused
its administrative investigative powers for the purpose of conducting
law enforcement. 145 Assertions by Chertoff and Customs Enforcement
Assistant Secretary Julie Myers of uncovering identity theft during
Swift & Co. raids lends strong support for this claim, 146 as does the
fact that during the raid, ICE asked the workers specific questions
about how they obtained their identifications. 147 In addition, ICE
agents denied union representatives access to the workers during the
interviews for the stated reason that a criminal investigation was
ongoing. 148 Ironically, however, the relatively low yield in criminal
prosecutions is likely to preclude a plausible Fourth Amendment
argument based on ICE's abuse of its broad immigration investigative
authority for criminal law enforcement purposes.
In parallel cases, where the argument has been that the
administrative function is only a pretext for criminal law enforcement,
motions to suppress have not succeeded. 149 The Court's position is
generally to avoid trying to guess the real intent or motivation of law
enforcement officers when acting, approving the action as long as
144

Id.

145

See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (requiring probable cause

when government officials sought access to commercial establishment
evidence for criminal prosecution).
146
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
147
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 81 , at 5.

to gather

14a

Id.

149

See, e.g., Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) (stating ulterior

motives need not necessarily invalidate police conduct that is otherwise justified by
belief that violation of law has occurred) .
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officers have "objective" Fourth Amendment grounds. 15° Courts are
likely to consider Whren v. United States controlling in this regard. 151
There, the Court refused to consider whether the true motives of
police officers who detained a group of young men for a minor traffic
infraction were to investigate them for drug possession .152 The Court
held that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis." 153
One important distinction between Whren and the Swift & Co. raids,
however, is that ICE lacked particularized probable cause to conduct
the administrative function . Obtaining warrants to conduct workplace
immigration raids, unlike traffic stops, has not required particularized
suspicion. 154 In this regard, the raids are doctrinally more comparable
to suspicionless vehicular checkpoints where other standards, such as
randomness of stops and notice to drivers , rather than probable cause or
reasonable susp1c10n, have satisfied the Fourth Amendment 's
However offensive generalized
requirement of reasonableness .155
warrants are to privacy, their judicial sanction in the immigration
context would preclude a pretextual doctrine claim as long as ICE is
conducting the administrative function as permitted by law.
Pretextual claims have been used to successfully challenge vehicle
checkpoints, but only when the government's stated primary purpose
cannot be justified as administrative.
For example, in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,156 which involved random stops at a
checkpoint to investigate drug crimes , police conceded that the
checkpoint was primarily for the detection of drugs, which the Court
considered primarily a criminal law enforcement purpose. 157 The
Edmond facts differ from workplace immigration raids, however, given
150
See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal
Procedure, 76 Miss. L.J.339 ,3 40 (20 06).
151
See 517 U.S. 806.
152
Id. at 818-19.
153
Id. at 813.
154
Int '! Molders' & Allied Workers ' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547,
553 (9th Cir. 1986) (agreeing with D.C. Circuit that immigrant workplace warrants
require only reasonable belief unauthorized workers may be present and not that each
be particularl y named) ; Blackie's House of Beef, Inc . v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding constitutionality of immigration workplace warrant
lacking particularized suspicion ).
155
See Mich . Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , 453 (1990) (upholding sobriety
checkpoint where officers stopped vehicles without reasonabl e suspicion , that is ,
when polic e used neutral guidelines for carrying out roadblock and its purpos e was to
protect public from drunk drivers).
156
531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000).
157
Id. at 50-51.
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that immigration enforcement is still their principal function, at least
in terms of results. In these, the majority of persons arrested are solely
being removed, rather than criminally charged, which may make the
raids constitutionally
perm1ss1ve.
Even after Edmond, drug
enforcement at immigration or sobriety checkpoints is constitutionally
permissive so long as the checkpoints remain primarily for an
administrative purpose. 158
5.

Exceeding the Scope of the Warrant Execution or Consent

A narrower challenge is not to the unparticularized warrant itself
but to its execution. Specifically, the challenge is that while civil
immigration warrants authorize ICE to enter worksite premises to
conduct an investigation, they do not authorize it to seize and search
the workers to discover their immigration status, much less to
question them about possible criminal identity theft charges. In fact,
this challenge is the principal basis for the union's Fourth Amendment
challenges filed on behalf of Colorado workers ensnared in the Swift
&: Co. raids. 159
Indeed, some early federal district court decisions preceding IRCA
affirmed that particularized probable cause was not required for
immigration workplace warrants, but also held that INS could not
execute such warrants to seize large numbers of workers and conduct
dragnet-style questioning without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. 160
These early cases, however, also recognized that Fourth Amendment
doctrine offered ICE some flexibility to investigate once inside the
premises, including acting within the reasonable scope of the warrant
to identify the workers , if any, named in the warrant 161 or to engage in

158
See Susan Lentz & Robert Charis, Full Speed Ahead: Illinois v. Lidster and
Suspicionless Vehicle Stops, CRIM.L. BULL , Mar.-Apr. 2007 , at pt. IV.
159
Class Action Request, supra note 81 , '19133-36; cf. Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, supra note 81, 919115-20.
160
Int'! Molders' &: Allied Workers ' Local Union No . 164 v. Nelson 799 F.2d 54 7
(9th Cir. 1986) (remanding to modify injunction ); Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod , 531
F. Supp. 1011 , 1019-21 (N.D. Ill. 1982) .
161
Those early warrants named half a dozen or so workers and listed "others " who
See Int '! Molders ' &: Allied
were believed to be working without authorization.
Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson , 643 F. Supp. 884, 889-90 (N.D . Cal. 1986) .
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consensual encounters with the workers, 162 which could lead to
reasonable grounds to detain or arrest.
Unfortunately, the INS v. Delgado163 precedent involving consensual
encounters during workplace raids still offers ICE significant
flexibility to question the workers and ascertain reasonable suspicion,
even if workers refuse to answer questions. The problem with general
warrants is precisely their undefined scope; thus, what constitutes its
reasonable execution remains vague but is likely to lie somewhere
between consensual encounters and indiscriminate seizures . In the
early cases involving workplace raids with general warrants, courts
drew the line when INS agents specifically targeted Hispanics, or
persons who simply looked "foreign," for more than brief questioning,
which led to their arrests. 164
In Delgado, the INS moved systematically through a garment factory,
asked employees to identify themselves, a!].d asked them one to three
questions about their citizenship. 165 During the survey, armed INS
agents were stationed near the exits while other agents moved
throughout the factory and questioned workers at their work areas. 166
The agents showed badges, had walkie-talkies, and carried arms,
though they never drew their weapons. 167 ICE's factual description of
the events in the Swift&:. Co. litigation is intended to suggest consent:
Swift management then brought approximately 700 people in
groups to the beef plant cafeteria . .. no workers were prevented
from leaving the area. Upon entry into the cafeteria, an
announcement was made by ICE (in both English and Spanish)
requestingthat all employees who were born in the United States
move to one side of the cafeteria, and the remaining employees
were asked to move to a different area . . . ICE agents then
conducted interviews, limited to eliciting background
information on each Swift employee to determine each
employee's nationality and immigration status . . . If certain
employees needed immigration documents outside the facility
to confirm their lawful status, these employees were allowed to
contact family and friends .. . There were no locked doors, and no
162
See id. at 891-97. Notably , the California district court in this case rejected the
plain view doctrine, as an alternative theory, reasoning the illegality of undocumented
workers, unlike contraband , is not immediately apparent. Id. at 893.
163
466 U.S. 210 , 218 (1984) .
164
Int'I Molders', 643 F. Supp . at 893-95 ; Pilliod, 531 F. Supp . at 1020-21.
165
466 U.S. at 212.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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one was preventedfrom leaving the area . . . Officers did not frisk
the employees or act in anything but a calm and courteous manner
so as tofacilitate the sefest environment possible.168
The workers, of course, tell a much different story of intimidation,
including an inability to contact family or lawyers and compelled
detention leading to the arrests. 169 Even if a fact-finder were to
embrace ICE's version of the raids, the Delgado facts and the raids at
Swift &: Co. differ sufficiently enough that an argument for consent
may still be precluded.
In the Swift &: Co. raids, ICE agents also surrounded the plants and
covered each entrance and exit. 170 Another significant difference in
the Swift &: Co. raids is that ICE agents removed workers from their
workstations and ordered them to the cafeteria for questioning and
document verification .171 Other factors courts may consider in
distinguishing the Swift & Co . raids from Delgado are the number of
ICE agents present during the raids, the length of detention during
questioning,
and discrepancies
in testimony
regarding
ICE
instructions to workers about the nature of the interviews .172
An unanswered question is how the courts will handle the apparent
refusal of some workers to collaborate with ICE during the interviews
at Swift &: Co. In Florida v. Royer, the Court held that refusal to
cooperate cannot alone be grounds to substantiate reasonable
suspicion. 173 In Illinois v. Wardlow, however, the Court narrowed
Royer and held that such refusal could be grounds if other factors exist
that in combination could lead a reasonable law enforcement agent to
conclude that a crime has or is about to be committed .174 Here, Swift
&: Co. was armed with information that hundreds of Form I-9s did not
match either SSA or CIS records . In light of this fact, a court could
hold that refusal to answer a question on immigration status or
identity along with other information possessed by ICE could be used
to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard laid out in Wardlow.
Another remaining question is whether, during these raids, ICE
could have compelled workers to disclose their identity for purposes

168
169
170
171

Respondent 's Memorandum of Law, supra note 63, at 2-5 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
See Cooper, supra note 66.

U.S. District Judge Mary Lou Robinson noted as much when denying Swift's
injunction request. Injunctive Order, supra note 132, at 8 , 10.
172
See supra notes 168-69.
173
460 U.S. 491 , 497-98 (1983).
174
528 U.S. 119,1 25 (2000 ) .
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of locating persons actually named in the warrant, as was ICE's
practice with the early warrants . ICE could argue that finding the
workers named in the warrant requires engagement of workers in brief
questioning . Interestingl y, ICE, in the Swift & Co. raids , shifted away
from a model of indiscriminate questioning of workers into one
resembling an administrative checkpoint where all workers , including
citizens and lawful permanent residents, are subjected to brief
rrocedures .
In permanent
questioning under standardized
immigration car checkpoints near the border, courts have considered
the suspicionless questioning of drivers about their immigration statu s
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 175 Of course , workplaces
are not like immigration checkpoints . They are not required to be
permanent, fixed locations ; they may not be near the border ; workers
do not have prior notice of the raids ; and , unlike public highways ,
workplaces comprise a greater zone of privacy .
In summary , IRCA's delegation of immigration enforcement to
private emplo yers , with the ensuing proliferation of databases , and
interagenc y information sharing about workers ' immigration status
have combined with preexisting doctrines permitting unparticularized
warrants and flexible consensual encounters in immigration raids to
significantl y erode workers ' expectations of privac y. The recent
workplace immigration raids , exemplified by the Swift & Co.
experience , closely resemble the general warrants that inspired the
adopti on of the Fourth Amendm ent.

B. Home ICE Raids: "Operation Return to Sender"
Since 2002 , ICE has put in place various enfor cement program s
design ed to apprehend persons it labels as fugitives or absconders ,
terms that refer mostly to persons who did not comply with removal
orders against them. 176 The National Fugitive Operation s Program
("NFOP ") w:as establi shed on February 25 , 2002 , under the umbrella
of ICE's Office of Detention and Removal. 177 DHS estimates that more
than 623 ,000 absconders live in the United States. 178 In respons e, ICE
175

Unit ed States v. Martin ez-Fu ert e, 428 U.S. 543, 545-4 6 (1976).
See Kevin Lapp , Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitutionality of the
Absconder Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REV.L. & Soc. CHANGE573 ,5 74 (200 5) .
177
U.S. Immi gra tion and Custo ms Enfor cement , Na tional Fugitive Operat ions
Program , http ://www .ice.gov/pVdro/ nfop .htm (last visited Dec. 25, 200 7) [hereinafter
NFO P] .
178
DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OFFICEOF INSPECTORGEN., AN ASSESSME
NT OF UNITED
STATES
' IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMSENFORCEMENT
'S FUGITIVE OPERAT
IONS TEAMS3
(2007) , available at http ://www. dh s.gov/xo ig/asse ts/mgmtr pts/OIG_07-34_Mar0 7.pdf.
176
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has deployed fifty-two Fugitive Operations Teams nationwide to
apprehend these so-called fugitives by conducting raids in people's
homes. 179 ICE expected that this number would increase to seventyfive teams in 2007 .180
In its initial stages, INS specifically targeted "priority" absconders, a
category that included persons with removal orders from countries
with an al Qaeda presence and subsequently persons with a criminal
history. 181 In May 2006, however, DHS launched "Operation Return
to Sender," which casts a wider net and targets all persons with a
preexisting removal order. 182 Since the program's inception, ICE has
identified over 25,000 persons who are in the United States in
violation of immigration law. 183 Of these, more than one-third were
not the people ICE originally targeted. 184
1.

Of Katz, Unreliable Data, and the Merging of Immigration and
Criminal Databases

The implementation of the absconder initiatives involved several
preliminary steps. First, the NFOP prepared the cases of immigration
fugitives for entry into the National Crime Information Center
Database ("NCIC"), 185 an FBI-operated federal criminal database
containing individuals ' criminal histories that is also available to local
law enforcement.
In 1996, Congress authorized the inclusion of
deported "felons" records in the NCIC186 to help authorities identify

179
Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement , More than 300
Arrested in ICE Operation Targeting Illegal Alien Fugitives and Immigration Violators in
San Diego and Imperial Counties (Apr. 3, 2003) , available at http://www.ice .gov/pi/
news/newsreleases/articles/070403sandiego.htm [hereinafter ICE Press Release].
180
Nina Bernstein , Hunts for "Fugitive Aliens" Lead to Collateral Arrests, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2007 , at Bl.
181
Lapp , supra note 176, at 574-75 .
182
ICE Press Release, supra note 179 .
183
Ernesto Londono , Database Is Tool in Deporting Fugitives: Police Officers Find
Illegal Immigrants in Warrant Searches, WASH.POST,June 12, 2003, at Al.
184
Elliot Spagat , Immigration Raids Net Many Not on the Radar, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS
, Apr. 6, 2007, available at http://oneoldvet.com/?page_id=856.
185
Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen. , to the INS Comm'r , FBI
Dir., U.S. Marshall Serv. Dir. , and U.S. Att'ys, § A, at 1 Qan. 25, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw .com/hdocs/docs/doj!abscndr0l2502mem.pdf
[hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum] .
186
Under the INA, felons are persons removed for the commission of an aggravated
felony as defined in the Act, which is not necessaril y a felony under federal or state
criminal law. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1990 , 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a) (43)
(2000).
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and prosecute persons for illegal re-entry .187 Until then, the longstanding policy had been to keep immigration law enforcement
information separate from that of criminal law enforcement. Now, the
NCIC contains records of persons with civil immigration removal
orders, whether or not they also have a criminal history . The database
contains around 247,500 ICE warrants, more than half of which are
for people with old removal orders, while the rest are records of
persons removed for the commission of crimes .188 To date, the few
court challenges to the inclusion of civil immigration records in the
NCIC database have failed. 189
Subsequently , the NFOP divided the immigration fugitives by
judicial district based on the most current address available. Then, the
relevant portion of each file was transmitted to the appropriate field
office and assigned to an apprehension team . 190 The NFOP also
became the clearinghouse for all leads on immigration fugitives
gleaned from information received from law enforcement or other
sources vaguely referred to as "intelligence assets. " 191
The apprehension teams arresting "priority" absconders comprised
both immigration and FBI agents, 192 though ICE alone has conducted
the most recent raids. The apprehension teams procured warrants to
execute the raids based on information compiled on each absconder
from their immigration records . At least some of the information
gathered from the arrests was then 1mtered into a criminal database . 193
Unfortunately, much of the information that forms the basis for
these fugitive warrants is unreliable. Immigration agencies have been
notorious for atrocious record-keeping and faulty databases , including
errors in removal order files. 194
187
A person previously removed who re-enters or attempts to re-enter may be
puni shed with up to two years imprisonment. Id. § 1326(a) (2000). This sentence
can increase up to ten years if the person who re-enters or attempts to enter was
remo ved because of the commission of three or more misdemeanors or one
nonaggravated felony . The sentence can increase up to 20 years if the removal was for
the conviction of an aggravated felony. Id. § 1326(b) .
188
Londono , supra note 183.
189 Id.
190
Thompson Memorandum , supra note 185, at 2.
191
ICE Press Release, supra note 179.
192 Id.
193
The Thompson Memorandum did not specify whether this database is the
NCIC or a different one. Instead there is a reference to entry into a "Computerized
Reporting System." Thompson Memorandum, supra note 185, at 4.
194
Memorand um from Glenn A. Fine , Inspector Gen ., U.S. Dep't of Justice , on
Immigration and Nationa lization Service's Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders
(Feb. 25, 2003), available at http:/ /www. usd oj .gov/oiglreports/INS/e0304/memo .pdf
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Several other factors also result in incorrect records. First, many of
the removal orders date back years, 195 which increases the probability
that persons other than the person subject to the removal order live at
the address when the warrant is finally executed. Second, DHS relies
on the addresses provided by noncomplying immigrants, who often
move to avoid immigration authorities.
Third, address changes
reported to immigration agencies often are not recorded in the
databases. 196 In addition, many persons in the databases are not even
aware of their removal orders because notice was sent to the incorrect
address or because DHS never gave the immigrant notice of her
removal order. 197 As a result, the administrative warrants are often
issued on the basis of incorrect information about the person 's place of
residence, 198 or against people who do not know they have a removal
order at all .
Consider the story of Elizabeth Pozada, a Peruvian national, who
did not know she had a four-year-old removal order against her when
ICE showed up at her door in late 2006 . She thought her case for
political asylum was on appeal since her initial denial in 2001. In fact,
Pozada had been living in the United States for fifteen years when ICE
agents came knocking and arrested her and her husband in their South
Florida home .199 Two weeks after her arrest, Pozada was released to
[hereinafter Fine Memorandum].
"Our interviews and recent reports prepared by
GAO and the INS Office of Internal Audit confirm that the INS continues to face
significant data accuracy problems. During this review, we compared data from the
INS's and EOIR's alien case tracking and management systems and found name,
nationality , and case file number discrepancies , as well as cases missing from the
electronic files ... . According to INS, data discrepancies are caused by data entry
errors, incompatibilities between the systems, and the lack of a system for correcting
data inconsistencies ." Id. See generally Thomas W. Donovan , The American
Immigration System: A Structural Change with a Different Emphasis, 17 lNT'Lj. REFUGEE
L. 574 (2005) (discussing how INS's administrative disarray led to its replacement
with Department of Homeland Security in 2002); Catherine Etheridge Otto, Tracking
Immigrants in the United States: Proposed and Perceived Needs to Protect the Borders of
the United States, 28 N.C.]. lNT'L L. & COM. REG. 477 (2002) (discussing series of
proposed databases and technological improvements to track immigrants inside
United States) .
195
See Ruth Morris, U.S. Adding Fugitive Squads that Target Immigrants Who Ignore
Expulsion Orders, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Feb . 26 , 2007, available at
http://oneoldvet.com/?page_id=28 l .
196
Michelle Wucker, The Top Ten Ways America Gets Immigration Wrong, AM.
IMMIGRATIO
N L. FOUND.,June 19, 2006, http://www.ailf.org/ipc/wucker_topten.shtml.
197
DHS and immigration courts are authorized to issue removal orders in absentia.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1990, 8 U.5.C. § 1229a(b) (5) (2000).
198
See The Associated Press, supra note 1.
199
Morris , supra note 195.
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settle her "affairs," including having to leave behind a house in
foreclosure and her eight-year-old, U.S.-born son, who would have to
move in with her brother, a naturalized U.S. citizen. 200
Unfortunately, even knowing that an administrative warrant could
contain the wrong address, ICE's strategic practice in conducting these
raids has been to round up every person living in the home, ask for
proof of immigration status, and arrest those unable to provide it. ICE
acts in the hope , not under reasonable suspicion much less probable
cause, that some of the current residents in the home are also
undocumented . For example, during an East Hampton , New York,
raid in March 2007, ICE executed ten warrants to arrest twenty-eight
persons "discovered" to be in the country without authorization
during the raid .20 1 As is standard practice, several armed ICE agents
came to the door before dawn, knocked, and yelled to open up. Once
inside, the agents inquired about every occupant 's immigration status,
allegedly for officer safety .202
Not surprisingly, when ICE shows up to execute warrants, those
living in the home are not always undocumented immigrants .
Regardless, if the residents have brown skin, they will experience the
same terror and intimidation. Consider the story of Christina Ramos,
a U.S. citizen and student at the University of Colorado, her U.S.citizen brother, a friend living with them, and her parents who are
lawful permanent residents from El Salvador. On March 13, 2007, at
about 7:30 a.m. , ICE agents jumped out of their van and pulled out
their guns, blocked the Ramos's driveway and yelled at Ramos, who
was outside her home. 203 When Ramos ran inside to take shelter, ICE
officers refused to identify themselves, chased her, tackled another
resident, searched everyone residing in the home for weapons, and
repeatedly screamed at them to verify their immigration status. 204
Immigration raids also affect mixed-status families - families
comprising both documented and undocumented citizens or residents.
The Pew Hispanic Center has found that there are 6.6 million
unauthorized families in the United States, where at least one head of
Id.
See Taylor K. Vecsey, Clergy Calls for Investigation of Federal Raid: Did
N STAR,Mar. 1, 2007 , available at
Immigration Agents Violate Civil Rights?, E. HAMPTO
200

201

http://www.easthamptonstar.com!D
NN/Defaul t. aspx? tabid= 1448.
w2 Id.
203
Katie Kerwin McCrimmon , Citizen Wants Apology for Raid: Immigration Agents
Search Legal Residents, ROCKYMTN. NEWS(Denver, Colo.), Mar. 24, 2007 , at 4.
204
Id. For a similar story involving a home raid against an immigrant family with
legal status, see Samuel G. Freedman , Immigration Raid Leaves Sense of Dread in
Hispanic Students, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007 , at Bl.
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household is undocumented, comprising a total of 14.6 million
people, most of them U.S. citizens or lawful residents. 205 In fact, 3.1
million U.5.-born citizen children have at least one parent who is
undocumented. 206 As a result, ICE has raided homes with U.S. citizen
children. One such child is Kebin Reyes, who at seven years old was
taken into custody along with his father, Noe Reyes, who had been
ordered deported in 2000. 207 Whether ICE even had a warrant is
unclear. 208 Nonetheless, the child was taken into custody so as not to
leave him alone, despite requests by his father to allow him to call
relatives .209 The child is reported to have remained locked in a cell
with his father for about ten hours until picked up by an uncle. 210
During the ordeal, Kebin was given only bread and water, while agents
repeatedly denied his father's requests to make calls. 211
2.

The Litigation

In the Bay Area, where ICE has arrested more than 800 people in
house raids conducted mostly during four months in early 2007, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and the
Lawyer 's Committee for Civil Rights filed a Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") request with ICE . The FOIA request lists serious
concerns about aspects of the raids, including ethnic profiling and
misuse of warrants. 212
Other immigration rights groups have filed suits seeking injunctive
relief and compensatory damages on behalf of immigrants arrested
during fugitive raids. 213 A key example is Central Legal, Inc. 's lawsuit
on behalf of more than fifty immigrants arrested in their homes during
an April 2007 raid in Willmar, Minnesota. Their complaint alleges
205

JEFFREY5. PASSEL,PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE
UNAUTHORIZEDMIGRANT POPULATIONSIN THE U.S. 11-12 (2007), available at
http://pewhispanic .org/files/reports/61 .pdf.
206 Id.
207
Mark Prado , ACLU Files Suit on Behalf of Child Taken in Immigration Raid,
OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 27, 2007 , available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_qn4 l 76/is _2 0070427/ai_nl9063631.
20s Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211

Id.
Melissa McRobbie, ACLU Seeks Records On Raids; Group Wants ICE Training
Materials Among Other Things, PALO ALTO DAILYNEWS, Mar. 7, 2007 , available at
http://www.paloaltodailynews.com/article/2007-37 -03-07 -07-smc-immigration.
213
The American Immigration Law Foundation, Litigation Relating to ICE Raids,
http://www.ailf.org/ladclearinghouse_l22106_ICE.shtml
(last visited Dec. 25 , 2007).
212
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that the raids were conducted without a warrant and that ICE agents
identified themselves as police before storming into homes to arrest
the residents. 214 The ACLU also filed a civil lawsuit challenging Kebin
Reyes's detention on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, 215 while
the Ramoses are simply waiting for an apology. 216 More recently,
immigrant rights groups filed a lawsuit challenging the New Haven
raids, which occurred only two days after the city adopted a program
to issue identification cards to all residents , including undocumented
immigrants, to allow access to banking, library , and other public
services .217
Hundreds of similar newspaper stories echo the concerns detailed in
these lawsuits. It is difficult to conceive how the Fourth Amendment
could reasonably allow law enforcement to execute dragnets on
people 's homes without obtaining any warrant or by obtaining
warrants based on flawed databases. Nevertheless, here too, as with
challenging workplace raids, actual Fourth Amendment violations are
difficult to establish. Some immigrants are removed immediately
without a hearing and thus without an opportunity to raise a Fourth
Amendment challenge. 218 Similarly, those in removal proceedings also
lack a remedy because the exclusionary rule is unlikely to protect
them in the hearing, even if a violation is found. 219 Immigrants who
face criminal charges or motions to enjoin will encounter Fourth
Amendment doctrines that are quite favorable to ICE, as explored
below. Additionally, civil suits for damages must overcome liability
shields for government agencies and their officials, including the
doctrine of qualified immunity .220
214
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Damages at 17, Arias v. ICE , No. 07-CV-1959 ADM(JSM (C.D . Minn. July 27, 2007),
available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/Arias-ammcmpl.pdf.
215
Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution , Reyes v. Alcantar , No. 07-02271 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/Reyes-Complaint.pdf.
216
McCrimmon, supra note 203.
217
Immigrant Advocacy Groups Sue Over New Haven Raids, HARTFORD CouRANT,
Aug. 11, 2007 , at B7.
2 18
Pre-existing removal orders are enforced without a hearing . Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) of 1990 § 240(d) , 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2000).
219
The violation must rise to the level of egregiousness for the exclusionary
remedy to apply. See generally Migas, supra note 15 passim (analyzing narrow Fourth
Amendment challenges that meet egregiousness standard).
220
Civil lawsuits to challenge immigration agents ' abuses are difficult to win in
part because of doctrines , such as qualified immunity , but also because of immigrants '
diminished constitutional protections . Officers are only civilly liable when their
conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
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Defective Warrants

ICE's primary reliance on information from immigration databases
as a basis for issuing warrants could be grounds for a Fourth
Amendment challenge, at least when the information in the warrants
contains errors.
Specifically, the challenge would allege ICE's
knowing and exclusive reliance on inaccurate immigration databases
to certify the existence of removal orders, the person's identity, or his
address, is insufficient for substar;tiating probable cause.
There are several considerations that could undermine this
challenge.
First, courts have not required foolproof evidentiary
reliability in finding probable cause and may tolerate some degree of
database inaccuracy. 221 Second, courts may tolerate immigration
inaccuracies even more when they result from an immigrant's own
failure to accurately report her residence change to immigration
authorities. Finally, the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary
rule could provide ICE with an excuse if its reliance on the warrants,
despite errors, is viewed as executed in good faith.
A 2003 study of immigration removal records revealed that
discrepancies in ide11tity and address information occurred in seven
percent of the 308 cases of immigrant files with final orders, and
eleven percent of the 4 70 cases of aliens from states that sponsor
terrorism. 222 Whether this statistic is sufficient for courts to invalidate
warrants that rely solely on immigration data is an open question.
However, parallel challenges to the FBI's NCIC database, which is also
known for its inaccuracies, 223 have not been successful. 224 In those
challenged cases , however, there existed corroborating information
and thus the databases were not the sole basis for substantiating

should have known. See generally Steve Helfand , Desensitization to Border Violence &
the Bivens Remedy to Effectuate Systemic Change, 12 LA RAZAL.J. 87, 121 (2001);
Stephen A. Rosenbaum , Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case for Civilian Review of
Uncivil Conduct, 7 LARAZAL.J.1, 36 (1994).
221
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1995) (upholding use of evidence
obtained from false arrest record that was product of clerical error) ; United States v.
Hines , 564 F.2d 925 , 928 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that reliance upon FBI's NCIC
database to substantiate probable cause for arrest was acceptable) .
222
OFFICEOF THEINSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,REPORTNo. 1-2003-004 ,
THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICES
' REMOVALOF ALIENSISSUESFINAL
ORDERS14 (2003), available at http://www.npr.org!documents/2005/mar/doj_alien_
removal.pdf.
223
See OFFICEOF THEINSPECTORGEN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICEAUDITREPORT:05-27,
REVIEWOF THETERRORIST
SCREENING
CENTER:EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
(2005), available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/oiglreports/FB1/a0527/exec.htm.
224
United States v. Davis, 568 F.2d 514,515 (6th Cir. 1978) ; Hines, 564 F.2d at 928.
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probable cause .225 This fact could distinguish the immigration raid
cases from those challenging reliance on the NCIC during traffic stops.
Were courts to accept probable cause challenges to immigration
warrants based on erroneous data, ICE could still rely on the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith doctrine as
established in United States v. Leon excuses errors, including computer
errors, as long as law enforcement believes in "good faith" that the
warrant was valid. 226 In essence, this doctrine has excused inadvertent
or even negligent disregard of warrant inaccuracies by police, except
when that disregard is "su1'stantial and deliberate." 227
In Arizona v. Evans, for example, the Court applied the good faith
exception to deny the suppression of a marijuana joint discovered
during police execution of an arrest warrant that, unbeknownst to the
officer, had been quashed. 228 Evans is distinguishable from the ICE
database errors, however, because in Evans the error was attributable
to a justice court clerk who failed to inform the warrant section of the
sheriffs office that a judge had ordered the warrant quashed. 229
However questionable the premise that the deterrence purpose of the
exclusionary rule is intended to curtail solely police and not also
judicial misconduct, 230 ICE warrant errors are attributable to DHS
record-keeping and data entry, except for those based on an
immigrant's own failure to provide accurate information.
Errors
attributable to law enforcement entities as a whole could exempt the
application of the good faith rule since good faith is measured against
the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers, not solely those
who execute the warrant. 231

225

See Davis, 568 F.2d at 515; Hines, 564 F.2d at 928.
468 U.S. 897 , 919-21 (1984) .
227
Id. at 908-09 (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). See
generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J.483, 490-93 (2006) (explaining
holding in United States v. Leon).
228
514 U.S. 1, 3 (1995).
229 Id.
230
Id. Similarly , in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 350-53 (1987) , the Court applied
the good faith exception when police relied on a statute later declared
unconstitutional to conduct a search. There , the Court similarly concluded that the
exclusionary rule deterrence was not intended by the legislature .
231
See Taslitz, supra note 227, at 502-04.
226
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Unconstitutional Warrant Execution

ICE's dragnet strategy when enforcing individual removal order
warrants may also exceed the reasonable scope of the warrants '
execution . Several questions arise here. The first question involves
the constitutional "knock and announce" requirement before the
execution of warrants. 232 Immigrant rights groups have advised their
clients not to open the door when ICE arrives. Does ICE have
authority to force entry into the home? If so, how long must ICE
wait? With criminal warrants, the knock and announce requirement
only requires law enforcement to wait a reasonable time for occupants
to respond to their knock , after which they may enter by force. 233
What is a reasonable waiting period , furthermore, is partly up to the
discretion of law enforcement, particularly in cases where evidence
might be easily disposed or destroyed .234
Unlike drugs , however, immigrants are not disposable, though they
admittedly can hide . In fact, in contrast to criminal warrants, ICE's
administrative warrants do not require immigrants to answer the door
or allow entry. 235 Were a pattern of refusal to develop , however ,
courts might be more willing to create similar exceptions to the knock
and announce rule as have developed in criminal cases .236 ICE has
reportedly announced themselves as police rather than as immigration
agents .237 Even if courts recognize this practice as a violation of the
knock and announce rule , a remedy may not exist. Of note is the
Court 's recent holding that knock and announce violations would not
require suppression of all related evidence .238

232
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 , 927 (1995 ) (holding that factor for
considering reasonableness of search is whether officers knock and announce their
presence and authority before entering dwelling, as required by common law) .
233
WILLIAM E. RINGEL,EXECU
TION OF WARRA
NTS,SEARCH
ESANDSEIZURE,ARRESTS,
ANDCONFESS
IONS§ 6 :10 (2007).
234
United States v. Banks , 540 U.S. 31 , 31 (2003) (approving forceful entry after
officers knocked , announced , and waited for 15 to 20 seconds and evidence sought
involved cocaine ).
235
See Bernstein , supra note 180 (reporting on DHS Secretary Chertof Ps
explanation that civil immigration warrants do not permit ICE to force entry); Jerry
Seper , Outnumbered in a Hunt for Aliens: Force of 200 Charged with Tracking 400 ,000
Criminals, "Absconders," WASH. TIMES,July 20 , 2004 , at Al (describing same practice ).
236
Banks, 540 U.S. at 31.
237
Bay Area Communities in Uproar Over Raids, EL TECOLOTE
ONLINE, Mar . 22, 2007 ,
http://news .eltecolote. orglnews/view _article .html ?article_id=268824dad4 7cb l 4d56fe4ec ed
7a0al 13.
238
Hudson v. Michigan , 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-64 (2006 ).
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The second issue raised by ICE's warrant execution practices is the
reasonableness of the scope of warrant's execution once ICE gains
home entry: may ICE reasonably seize and question all the occupants
in the home about their immigration status? Unfortunately, under
some circumstances , the answer may be yes. In Muelher v. Mena,239
police officers, armed with a criminal search warrant based on
probable cause that Raymond Romero had been involved in a gangrelated drive-by shooting , executed the warrant and detained
respondent Iris Mena in handcuffs and then asked her about her
immigration status .240 The Court considered the handcuffing a
reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment as a necessary
measure to protect officer safety .241 The officers, however, then
proceeded to ask Mena about her immigration status . The Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit on the immigration status questioning
issue, holding that there is no requirement of particularized reasonable
suspicion for purposes of inquiring into citizenship status .242 Instead,
the Court expanded the legal fiction of consent. Even though Mena
had been handcuffed for more than two hours , the Court sanctioned
ICE's questioning of her immigration status without reasonable
suspicion .243 In essence, the Court did not consider inquiry into
Mena's immigration status as an additional seizure under the Fourth
Amendment requiring independent jus•.ification .
Mena may be read narrowly to hold that a person otherwise legally
detained may be asked "consensually" about her immigration status
without an additional need for reasonable suspicion. It is unclear ,
however, whether Mena could have been compelled to answer the
questions if she had refused to answer. In other words, can the
residents of a home who are not the targets of an arrest warrant refuse
to answer questions about their immigration status? Generally , in
nonconsensual encounters, the Court has required reasonable
suspicion to compel a person to disclose his or her identity. 244 Here,
however , we return to the question of what ICE officers can
reasonably do during warrant execution, beyond consensual inquiries,
which is a question also relevant to workplace raids. 245
239

544 U.S. 93, 95-96 (2005).
Id.
241
Id. at 100.
242
Id. at 95 .
243 Id.
244
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist . Court of Nev. , Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177,
181-83 (2004 ).
245
See supra notes 159-75 and accompanying text .
240
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Unlike workplace raids, home raids may offer ICE agents broader
discretion to compel residents to disclose their identity. First, ICE
could argue that asking residents their name and even, perhaps,
requiring identification may be necessary to identify whether the
person is the one named in the warrant. Second, ICE may argue that
officer safety compels identification.
The safety justification is less convincing, however, when, unlike
Mena, the case does not involve a violent precedent.
Despite the
rhetorical force of words like "fugitives" and "absconders," the ICE
warrants enforce the law against persons who failed to comply with a
removal order, not violent criminals.
The requirement to force
disclosure of a person's immigration status is even less reasonable.
The reality is that, in most cases, ICE is likely to claim to possess
reasonable suspicion to make the inquiry based on factors such as
foreign appearance, language and identity documents, and even the
refusal to answer questions. 246

c.

Pretextual Enforcement

The absconder initiative has a clear criminal law enforcement
nature. Especially in its initial stages, an independent aim of the raids
was to investigate terrorist leads and arrest persons with a criminal
history. 247 But even outside these categories, absconders are not solely
immigration violators but also criminals per se, as they could face up
to four years of incarceration for failure to depart after a removal
order. 248 The entry of absconders' names into the NCIC, moreover,
indicates immigration agencies' shift to treat absconders as criminals
and not solely as immigration violators. That all the specific targets of
the absconder initiative are per se criminals under the law
distinguishes absconder raids from the workplace raids because
working without authorization in the United States is not yet a federal
crime, unless the person engages in identify theft. 249

246
Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (refusing to cooperate can be one
of several factors to establish reasonable suspicion).
247
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
248
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000 & Supp.
V. 2005).
249
Working without authorization in the United States continues to constitute
solely a civil immigration violation, despite recent legislative efforts to impose
criminal sanctions. See Enic Trucios-Haynes , Civil Rights, Latinos, and Immigration:
Cybercades and Other Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 BRANDE IS L.j.
637 , 652-53 (2006).
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This distinction between the absconder home raids and workplace
raids could bar ICE from relying on the pretextual doctrine to justify
reliance on its administrative powers to conduct criminal enforcement.
The pretextual doctrine confers broad discretion on ICE to conduct
criminal law enforcement, 250 but courts might be more willing to draw
the line where all the targets of the arrests could face criminal
liability. 251 Ironically, ICE could argue in its defense that, as executed ,
the absconder ICE raids primarily serve an administrative immigration
function: to detect and remove immigration violators, and not to
criminally charge them. In fact, ICE retains discretion to treat all
absconders as immigration violators rather than as criminals .
Moreover , ICE arrests not only the absconders but also co-residents
who are immigration violators but not criminals, as mere unlawful
presence is not yet criminal under the immigration laws. Thus , to the
extent that ICE is primarily opting to pursue removal for the persons
arrested, courts might still be willing to justify the program under the
pretextual doctrine .

d.

Racial Profiling

When ICE instituted the "priority" absconder program to target
primarily Muslims and persons of Arab descent, equal protection
violations were explicit. 252 With the expansion of the "fugitive
initiatives" to include the more than 600 ,000 persons with removal
orders, the program is now at least facially neutral. Its disparate
targeting of Latino immigrants , however, is documented in nearly all
media stories detailing the raids .253 Courts are unlikely to consider
these challenges at least in the context of Fourth Amendment
doctrine. For example, the Court has directed defendants in "driving
while black " cases to raise charges of disparate law enforcement in
civil rights lawsuits rather than in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. 254

250

See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (striking down car
drug checkpoint because primary purpose of narcotics interdiction could not be
rationalized in terms of highwa y safety but for scourge of illegal drugs) .
252
See Lapp, supra note 176, at 586-89.
253
The disparate targeting of Latino workers is also evident in workplace raids ,
which primaril y occur in segregated workspaces occupied primarily by Brown or
Latino workers . See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preferencefor the Subservient
Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.961, 965-66
(2006).
254
See David Harris , "Driving While Black" and Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
251
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Moreover, the Court has tolerated racial targeting in immigration
enforcement, at least at immigration checkpoints and as a factor in the
determination of reasonable suspicion in traffic enforcement. 255 These
cases are nominally distinguishable on the basis of how invasive the
practices are in the context of home searches . Yet, to the extent that
warrants allow such searches, courts may not view the presence of ICE
in the home as offensive to the Fourth Amendment.
In summary , even though ICE executes defective warrants to
conduct dragnet raids in people 's homes and disproportionately
targets Latinos, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence offers little
protection to immigrants .
C. The Future of Local Immigration Raids: The Hazleton
Anti-Immigrant Ordinances

Since the events of 9/11, anti-immigrant groups like the Federation
of American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the U.S. English-Only,
Inc. have been supporting or promoting local efforts to pass antiimmigrant ordinances or include them as propositions in key local
elections. 256 In 2006 alone, at least seventy-eight state immigrationrelated bills were approved in thirty-three states .257 These ordinances
range from denying the undocumented basic worker protections to
restricting their access to higher education and other state benefits,
such as denying them driver's licenses, barring them from
congregating as day laborers, and prohibiting them from speaking
Spanish. 258 The ordinances also include housing and employer
restrictions , such as the 2006 Hazleton, Pennsylvania anti-immigrant
ordinances that sought to bar the undocumented from taking jobs ,
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87]. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY544 , 550-51 (1997).
Unfortunately, a remedy for selective immigration enforcement may not be available
under equal protection grounds . See DAVIDCOLE, ENEMYALIEN: DOUBLESTANDARDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMSIN THE WAR ON TERRORISM204 (2003) (discussing
Court 's tolerance of ethnicall y selective targeting). But see Lapp , supra note 176 , at
592-600.
255
See Mirande, supra note 73 , at 372-74 .
256
See Edward Sifuentes , FAIR Could Join Escondido to Defend Rental Ban, N.
COUNTY TIMES (San
Diego ,
Cal.),
Oct.
28,
2006,
available at
http://www.nctimes .com/articles/2006/10/29/news/top_stories/22_03_2810_28_06
.txt;
Howard Witt , It's Official: English-Only Movement Gains Traction: Hispanic Leaders
Alarmed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15 , 2006, at 4 .
257
Summer Harlow , Small Towns Play Big Role on Immigration: Fear of Persecution
Forces Many to Move, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 15, 2006 , available at
http://www.ijjblog.org/2006/10/small_towns_big_role_immigrati.html.
258 Aldana, supra note 31, at 270-85.
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renting apartments, or engaging in other commercial transactions.
These housing and employer ordinances would have required
employers, landlords, and businesses to monitor the immigration
status of workers and tenants. They also sought to impose both civil
and criminal penalties on employers, landlords , or businesses that
violated the restrictions.
1.

The Hazleton Ordinances

Beginning in July 2006, the City of Hazleton passed a series of four
ant1-1mmigrant ordinances
designed
to target and expel
undocumented immigrants from the town. 259 On July 13, 2006,
Hazleton passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, which it
subsequently replaced in September 2006 with Ordinance 2006-18, in
response
to
litigation
challenging
the July
ordinance's
constitutionality. 260 On December 28, 2006, also in response to the
litigation, the Hazleton City Council amended Ordinance 2006-18 by
adopting Ordinance 2006-40, which added section 7 dealing with the
ordinances' procedures and implementation. 261 In addition, in August
2006, Hazleton passed Ordinance 2006-13, titled "Establishing a
Registration Program for Residential Rental Properties. "262
On
December 28, 2006, Hazleton also enacted Ordinance 2006-35 with
the same title. 263
Under section 4, Ordinance 2006-18 forbids any entity doing
business in the city of Hazleton to hire or continue to employ any
worker who is not authorized to work under U.S. immigration laws. 264
All business entities that apply for a permit to engage in any type of
work in Hazleton must sign an affidavit "affirming that they do not
knowingly utilize the services of an unlawful worker. "265 Ordinance
2006-18 also seeks to deny "illegal alien[s]," defined as persons "not
lawfully present in the United States" the ability to obtain housing in
259
Not discussed in this Article is Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 Quly 13,
2006) , available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/Originalordinance .pdf, which is
an English-only provision.
260
See Hazleton , Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 , § 2 (Sept. 8, 2006) , available at
http://www.aclu .org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_secondordinance .pdf.
261
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Hazleton's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Lozano v. Hazleton , 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06cv01586) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
26 2 Id.
263 Id.
264
Ordinance 2006-18 , § 4(A).
265 Id.
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Hazleton based on their immigration status. 266 Specifically, the
ordinance prohibits the harboring of "illegal aliens," which includes
"to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of the law."267 Violation of
these terms by employers, businesses, or landlords could result, inter
alia, in civil penal ties and denial of licenses. 268
To enforce both the employment and housing restrictions, the
Hazleton ordinances rely on existing federal databases or else try to
In regards to the
establish citywide registration records. 269
employment restrictions, for example, a complaint by any city official
or entity to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office ("Code
Enforcement Office ") would trigger an investigation that would
require an employer to provide the identity of the alleged
undocumented workers within three days .270 In turn, the Code
Enforcement Office would seek to verify the worker's authorization to
work through Basic Pilot. 271 Ordinance 2006-18 , in fact, mandates
that all city agencies enroll and participate in the Basic Pilot Program,
and conditions the award of city contracts or business grants
exceeding $10,000 on participation in Basic Pilot. 272 Even when
Ordinance 2006-18 does not require such enrollment , those employers
that do not enroll risk exorbitant penalties. 273
The housing provisions go even further by requiring the creation of
a tenant registration system.
Ordinance 2006-13 requires all
occupants of rental units to obtain an "occupancy permit. " 274 To
obtain the permit, an applicant must provide "[p]roper identification
showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency ."275 Under the
ordinance, Hazleton's Code Enforcement Office officials determine
whether each tenant presented proof of legal immigration status.
Tenants who allow additional tenants in the rental unit must first
obtain written permission from the landlord . In turn , those additional

266

Id. §§ 3(D), 5(A) .
Id. § 5(A)(l) .
268
Id.§§ 4(B)(3)-(4) , 5( B)(8) .
269
Memorandum of Law, supra note 261 , at 13-16 .
270
Id. § 4(B)(l)-(3) .
271
Id. § 4(B)(5); see supra Part I.A. I.
272 Ordinance 2006-18 , § 4(C) , (D).
273 Id. § 4(B)(5), (E).
274
Hazleton , Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7b (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://www. aclu. org!pdfs/immigran ts!hazleton_firstordinance. pdf.
275
Id.
267
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occupants must obtain their own permits. 276 Further, tenants must
inform the city when they move or when members of their family
move out. 277 Thus, all tenants who do not own their home must
disclose, in addition to their immigration status, their place of
residence, as well as information about their associations.
All Hazleton landlords are barred from renting to unregistered
tenants. 278 The housing restrictions would be enforceable upon
receipt by the Code Enforcement Office of any complaint by a city
official, business entity, or resident. 279 Hazleton 's Code Enforcement
Office then has the responsibility of using the identity information
provided by the landlord 280 or tenant upon registration 281 to verify the
person 's immigration status with the federal government. Though the
process for immigration verification is not specified in the ordinances,
Hazleton officials have clarified in documents submitted in the
litigation challenging the ordinances that verification would consist of
seeking authority from the federal government to use or access the
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE") Program. 282
SAVE administers and controls access to information contained in
the Verification Information System ("VIS") database .283 This database
is nationally accessible and contains selected immigration status
information compiled from more than sixty million records. 284 SAVE
allows federal , state , and local government agencies and licensing
bureaus to obtain immigration status information in order to
determine noncitizen applicants ' eligibility for public benefits. 285 In
order to join the SAVE program and acquire access to VIS, an agency
must first establish a Memorandum of Understanding with the SAVE
Program , and then establish a purchase order to pay for VIS
transaction fees. Access to SAVE is subject to CIS resource limitations
and other legal or policy criteria .286 SAVE was actually designed
276

Id. § lO(b) .
Id. § 7(b).
278
Ordinance 2006-18, § 5(A) .
279 Id. § 5(B)(l) .
280
Id. § 5(B)(3) .
281
Ordinance 2006-13 , § 7(b)(l)(g).
282
Ordinance 2006-18 , § 5(B)(3).
283
See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services , Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) Program, http://www.u scis.gov/portal/ site/uscis (search for
"SAVE"; follow top hyperlink for "Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
(SAVE) Program ") (last visited Dec. 25, 2007).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
277
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primarily to permit federal and local entities to determine an
applicant's eligibility to receive certain public benefits . It was never
intended to provide a final finding of fact or conclusion of law about
the applicant's immigration status in the United States. 287
2.

The Litigation on Privacy

In September 2006, the ACLU, joined by several law firms and
nonprofits, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania against the City of Hazleton challenging the
ordinances on behalf of several named plaintiffs , including several
undocumented noncitizen adults, as well as children and U.S. citizen
The ACLU also filed for a
children of the undocumented. 288
temporary restraining order, which the district court granted on
October 31, 2006. 289 Trial began on March 12, 2007 .290 On July 26,
the district court invalidated the ordinances on preemption and due
process grounds, but it dismissed the privacy allegations based on lack
of factual information that would allow the court to balance the
individuals ' with the government's privacy interests. 291 Despite this
outcome, the issue may resurface on appeal and the challenge is worth
considering in this Article.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, violations of privacy rights based
on the ordinances ' housing registration and immigration verification
provisions . In addition to these provisions, Ordinance 2006-40 would
have required landlords to cure violations of the housing restrictions
either by initiating eviction proceedings, giving notice to quit, or
extracting additional identifying information from the tenant or
occupant. 292 Thus, under the ordinance, the onus fell on the landlord
287
See Responsibility of Certain Entities To Notify the Immigration and
Naturalizat ion Service of Any Alien Who the Entity "Knows " Is Not Lawfully Present
in the United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,301-01 , 58,302 (Sept. 28, 2000) ("A Systematic
Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) response showing no Service record on an
individual or an immigration status making the individual ineligible for a benefit is
not a finding of fact or conclusion of law that that individual is not lawfully present. ") .
288
First Amended Complaint at 5-19, Lozano v. Hazleton , 496 F. Supp. 2d 477
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06cvl586).
289
Temporary Restraining Order at 12-13 , Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (No.
3:06cvl586).
290
Press Release , ACLU, Trial Begins in Landmark Challenge to Anti-Immigrant
Laws in Hazleton , PA: Laws Would Legitimize Discrimination against Immigrant
Comm unity , Groups Charge (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http ://www.acl u.org/
immigrant s/discrim/28976prs200703 l 2.html.
29 1
Lozano , 496 F. Supp. 2d at 554 .
292
Hazleton, Pa. , Ordinance 2006-40 , § 7(0) (Dec. 26 , 2006) , available at
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to obtain highly confidential documents proving lawful status . The
complaint protested that the ordinances did not impose any
confidentiality obligation on the landlords who receive such
information. 293 Moreover, under the ordinances, this information
would then be provided to the Code Enforcement Office for purposes
of verification, and in the case of a complaint, the information must be
retained. 294
Even worse, because the ordinances did not provide any prohibition
against subjecting tenants to searches, private or public officials could
have conducted unlimited searches. With respect to the latter, the
ordinances specified that the following persons were authorized to
enforce them:
"The Chief of Police , Any Police Officer, Code
Enforcement Officer, the Fire Chief, the Deputy Fire Chief, a Health
Officer, and the Director of Public Works ."295 Further, in the course
of the litigation, Hazleton officers participating in the litigation
clarified that "police powers " could be used to "preserv[e] the public
health, safety and morals" of Hazleton, as well as to abate public
nuisances .296 In the "Findings and Declaration of Purpose" in
Ordinance 2006-18, the city stated that the presence of undocumented
immigrants in Hazleton is per se a public nuisance and "a harm to the
health, safety, and welfare of authorized U.S. workers and legal
residents in the city."297 It is therefore reasonable to presuppose that
the ordinances sought to authorize searches to uncover immigration
violations.
3.

Local Immigration Raids?

At the same time that Congress and federal immigration agencies
seek to increase local enforcement collaboration with immigration
enforcement, 298 local governments are passing their own ordinances to
control or restrict undocumented immigration . What are the
implications of these ordinances for future immigration raids
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_thirdordinance
.pdf.
293
Memorandum of Law, supra note 261 , at 73.
294
Id. at 78.
295
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-35, § 8 (Dec. 13, 2006) , available at
http://www.aclu .org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_ordinance_200635.pdf;
Hazleton , Pa.,
Ordinance 2006-13 , § 8 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www .aclu .org/
pdfs/immigran ts/hazleton_firstordinance. pdf.
296
Memorandum of Law, supra note 261 , at 79.
297
Hazleton , Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 2 (Sept. 8, 2006) , available at
http://www .aclu .org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_secondordinance.pdf.
298
See Pham , supra note 30 , at 1374 .
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conducted by local law enforcement? Some local police are already
enforcing immigration laws during traffic stops , in prisons, and, at
times, even when responding to other local policing duties .299 The
Hazleton ordinances and similar ordinances throughout the country,
which seek to impose employment and housing restrictions, open the
door wider to questions about how and whether local police will also
regulate workplaces and homes. Here too, there is a trend to employ
federal databases containing information on immigration for purposes
of local immigration enforcement.
One thing is certain: like federal enforcement, local immigration
enforcement will be characterized as regulatory in nature , particularly
when the consequences continue to be nonpenal.
In Hazleton ,
undocumented tenants and workers will be forced out of workplaces
and homes , and possibly reported to immigration agencies, but not
prosecuted per se. Nevertheless, these consequences are all extremely
harsh , and criminal prosecution, as in the federal immigration
enforcement context for such crimes as identity theft and fraud,
remains a strong possibility.
An interesting parallel exists between these new anti-immigrant
ordinances and attempts by local police to regulate disorder among the
homeless and poor. For many generations, local police enforced laws
criminalizing public order offenses, such as vagrancy, loitering, and
public drunkenness, until the courts stepped in to declare them
unconstitutional under doctrines such as the prohibition against status
These legal challenges, however, encouraged the
crimes. 300
proliferation of order-maintenance policies that replaced criminal with
administrative enforcement , namely through property regulation tools
like zoning laws. 30 1 Here again , the relaxed criminal safeguards in the
context of administrative law enforcement has made it possible for
these measures to survive judicial scrutiny at a significant "cost of
Local anti-immigrant ordinances, such as those in
rights ."302
Hazleton , if successful , have the potential to exponentially multiply
the number of law enforcement officers involved in immigration raids,
and are likely to suffer from similar "costs of rights, " including to the
Fourth Amendment.

299

See, e.g., Kobach , supra note 26 (describin g local enforc ement of immigrati on

laws).
300
301
302

Nicole Stelle Garn ett , Relocating Disorder, 91 YA. L. REV. 1075, 1077-78 (2005) .
Id. at 1078-79.
Id. at 1078.
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THE RAIDS' UNREASONABLENESS

In immigration law, reliance on the characterization of immigration
raids as administrative to allow for more flexible law enforcement has
becoming increasingly difficult to justify. In other administrative law
contexts, the Court's adoption of a balancing test that pairs the
government's interest against that of the individual has led to the
erosion of privacy interests. 303 Professor Scott Sundby cautioned
almost two decades ago against Camara's unlimited application
beyond so-called administrative searches, given that terms like
"administrative search" or "inspection" are neither self-defining nor
self-limiting .304 This observation is particularly pertinent in the
immigration context where, increasingly, what were once civil
immigration violations have now been criminalized, resulting in an
unprecedented cooperation between criminal and immigration law
enforcement.
Indeed, immigration and other law enforcement
agencies have pretextually relied on the more flexible immigration law
enforcement power to conduct criminal investigations to also charge
persons with nonimmigration crimes, including allegations of identity
theft, terrorism, and drugs. Yet, the civil sanctions and procedures of
immigration enforcement are dire, and the liberty interests no less
substantial than in the criminal context.
Immigrants linger in
mandatory detention centers. Deportation separates them from family
and destroys their stakes in property, community, and jobs. To insist,
therefore, on the legal fiction of punitive versus nonpunitive
consequences to justify fewer constitutional protections for
immigrants, including privacy, is not only illogical but disingenuous.
It undermines the pain experienced by the "other," whose constructed
"illegality" strips them even of rights intended to protect against
governmental overreach and abuses.
Several scholars have documented, especially in the last twenty
years, how immigration control has increasingly adopted the practices
and priorities of the criminal justice system .305 Congress has created a

303
See Clancy, supra note 55, at 1003-15, 1023-36; Hemphill, supra note 34, at
218-20; Searle, supra note 41 , at 273-88 ; Sundby, supra note 36, at 392; Steven T.
Wax, The Fourth Amendment, Administrative Searches and the Loss of Liberty, 18 ENVTL.
L. 911, 917-27 (1988) (arguing that expansion of administrative search has led to loss
of liberty) .
304
Sundby, supra note 36, at 406-07.
305
See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky , The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 469 (2007) (surveying
how immigration law has been borrowing criminal law's priorities , theories and
methods but not its procedural aspects); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity:
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host of new immigration crimes, ranging from illegal re-entry to the
most recent attempt to criminalize simple immigration presence .306
Further , criminal prosecution for immigration violations has increased
rapidly, as have criminal penalties for such violations .307 This trend is
even more disturbing because, in most cases , an immigrant's tenuous
connection to a crime is constructed solely based on their attempt to
flee from economic and sometimes political repression. These socalled criminals who falsify their immigration documents include
asylum seekers and workers who cross the border or overstay their
visas and falsify documents in order to work. 308 As a result of
workplace raids more than 700 persons are facing criminal charges for
identit y theft or other immigration violations, while some employers
have been criminally
charged
for knowingly
hiring
the
undocumented. 309 The Swift & Co. raids alone yielded at least sixtyfive persons who are facing serious identity theft charges. 310 Several of
them have already pled guilty to fraud charges and face a possible
maximum sentence of ten years in prison and a $250,000 fine .311
Civil immigration enforcement, moreover , has become more
punitive and difficult to distinguish from criminal enforcement.
Mandatory immigration detention , previously reserved for the most
dangerous persons , is now broadly applied in almost all removal
cases .312 Indeed , immigration detainees are currently the fastest

Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003 )
(clarifying relationship between today 's harsh immigration reforms and severe
criminal control) ; Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crimes, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM.U. L. REV.367 (2006) (arguing that memb ership theory plays
role in convergence of criminal and immigration law by deeming regulated immigrant
unworth y of membership in society).
306
In 2005, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would have created
several additional crimes , including criminalizing the presence of the undocumented .
See Border Protection , Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 ,
H.R. 4437 , 109th Cong. (2005).
307
See Legomsky, supra note 305 , at 4 76-82 , Miller, supra note 305 , at 639-40;
Stumpf , supra note 305 , at 384.
308
See Miller, supra note 305, at 649-50 .
309
The Associated Press, supra note l; see also Jerry Seper, Janitor-Service Chiefs
Charged in Illegal Ring, WASH. TIMES,Feb. 23, 2007 , at Al (discussing criminal
indictments of IFCO Systems North America and Rosenbaum-Cunningham
International Inc. employers) .
310
Sprengelmeyer, supra not e 139.
311
The Associated Press, Six More Plead Guilty in Aftermath of Immigration Raid,
Apr. 18, 2007, available at http:// oneo ldvet.com/?page _id=l037#25 .
312
Miller, supra note 305 , at 614-15 ; Stumpf, supra note 305 , at 391.
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growing segment of the jail population in the United States. 313 Most
persons picked up in the latest wave of immigration raids have been
detained . Only a few have been released for humanitarian reasons or
because they were eligible for some other type of immigration relief.
In fact, those charged with any immigration crime or those with a
criminal history will not be eligible for bond or any other avenue of
relief from detention. 314
The criminal justice parallels in immigration enforcement, however,
have not resulted in correspondingly greater constitutional protections
for immigrants. As Professor Stephen H. Legomsky explains, the
criminal justice system has been asymmetrically imported into the
immigration control context. 315 The enforcement aspects of criminal
justice have been imported, without the bundle of procedural and
substantive rights recognized in criminal cases .316 This asymmetry has
meant that decision makers are left with no incentive to balance
immigrants ' interests against the government's interest to control
immigration .3 17
In the Fourth Amendment context, the asymmetry applies even
when the immigrant is charged criminally rather than placed in
removal proceedings. Again, pretextual doctrines permit prosecutors
to rely on the significantly more relaxed immigration-related Fourth
Amendment doctrines to justify the reasonableness of searches and
arrests .318 In addition, at times, even when a Fourth Amendment
violation is recognized, there is no remedy. Such is the case, for
example , with the most common federal immigration crime
charged - illegal re-entry .319 There , exclusion of any unlawfully
seized evidence does not remedy the Fourth Amendment violation
because the defendant's identity is never suppressible as the fruit of an
unlawful arrest and the government can prove its case simply by
providing proof of a prior removal order and the defendant 's renewed
presence in the United States .320
313

See Miller, supra note 305 , at 648-49.
Id. at 635-36 .
315
Legomsky , supra note 305 , at 472.
316 Id.
317
Id. at 4 73.
318
See supra Part I.
319
See generally James P. Fleissner &: James A. Shapiro , Sentencing Illegal Aliens
Convicted of Reentry After Deportation: A Proposal for Simplified and Principled
Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 264 (1996) (dis cussing recent and various congressional
314

measures that have resulted in increased prosecution of illegal re-entry).
320
Daniel P. Blank , Note , Suppressing Defendant's Identity and Other Strategiesfor
Defending Against a Charge of Illegal Reentry After Deportation, 50 STAN. L. REV. 139 ,
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Of course, when the immigrant does not face criminal charges for
his immigration transgressions, his privacy right is even less
meaningful, given the tendency of courts to undervalue the liberty
interest of persons not in criminal proceedings. In the immigration
context, the courts' insistence that deportation is not punishment has
translated into an unjustifiable legal tolerance for the pain that
immigrants experience from their, at times, permanent expulsion from
the United States, despite their long-term residence and vested stakes
in this country .
The recent immigration raids leave us with stories that document
the devastation of deportation on families as well. In Massachusetts,
for example, Governor Deval Patrick called immigration raids ' effect
on families a "humanitarian crisis, " when the state had to make
childcare arrangements for at least thirty-five children, ranging from
infants to age sixteen, whose parents were among at least 361 workers,
mostly women, who were arrested during a raid at the Michael Bianco,
Inc. leather factory .321 Additionally, in Massachusetts, ICE denied
social workers attempting to advocate on behalf of the children access
to the detainees because it was a law enforcement issue .322 When DHS
complied with Governor Patrick 's plea to halt flights to detention
centers in other states, DHS released sixty persons, who identified
themselves as a primary parent, on humanitarian grounds. 323 In some
cases , their children had stayed with family and friends, while
community groups stepped in to locate other children and provide
them with care. 324 At least one seven-month-old child, however, who
breastfed , required a feeding tube after being separated from his
mother for two days during the raid. 325 The degree of harm caused to
children , many who happened to be U.S. citizens, in the Massachusetts

140-41 (1997).
321
Monica Rhor , Immigration Raids Can Divide Families, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn!content/article/2007/
03/ll/AR2007031100762.html;
David Weber, Mass. Protests Feds' Immigration Flights,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2007 , available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynl
content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800181.html.
322 Weber , supra note 321.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
David Weber , Delahunt Says Congress Will Investigate Immigration Raid,
ASSOCIATEDPRESS, Mar.
11, 2007 , available at http://www.boston.com/
news/local/massachusetts/articles/200 7/03/11/delahunt_says_ congress_ will_investigate
_imrnigration_raid/.
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raids has prompted a congressional investigation by the House
Subcommittee on Immigration .326
To improve the plight of immigrants and to claim greater
constitutional protection on their behalf, scholars have argued that
deportation should be treated as punishment given the emphasis on
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation that bear on theories of
deportation. 327 However , privacy interests should not depend on the
type of consequences the persons might experience when they are
invaded. Privacy interests are intended to protect, among other
things , "freedom of thought ," "solitude in one's home, " "control of
information about oneself, " and "protection of one's reputation, "
harms that occur regardless of whether a person is criminally charged
or faces no "criminal" consequences. 328
Beyond these personal autonomy conceptions of privacy, there is
also the notion of privacy's relationship to antitotalitarianism. In his
influential article, The Right to Privacy, Professor Jed Rubenfeld
suggested that privacy should be defined as "the fundamental freedom
not to have one's life too totally determined by a progressively more
normalizing state. "329 Thus, to Rubenfeld, privacy should protect
against a "creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of
individuals ' lives. "330
In this regard, the consequences to the
individual should matter less in assessing the reasonableness of law
enforcement action . This again illustrates the fallacy of the balancing
approach . The reasonableness of privacy invasions by the state should
not be judged against the relative interest of the state or the individual.
Rather, they should be guided by the application of the original
reasonableness principles of the Fourth Amendment , including the
requirements for particularized warrants and probable cause.
Finally , privacy rights for immigrants should be recognized, despite
their constructed illegality, because there are compelling policy
reasons for protecting privacy in certain spaces .331 In the workplace ,
Id.
Legomsky , supra note 305, at 511-15; see also Kanstroom, supra note 14, at
1893-94 . See generally Robert Pauw , A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why
at Least Some of the Constitution'sCriminal ProcedureProtectionsMust Apply, 52 ADMI N.
L. REV. 305 (2000) (discussing deportation as punishment) .
328
See Daniel ]. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL L. REV. 1087, 1088
(2002 ).
329
Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.737, 784 (1989).
330 Id.
331
See Solove , supra note 328 , at 1142-43 (arguing that priva cy should be
constructed by law to safeguard important societal interests , even if thes e would not
be protected under reasonabl e expectation of privacy analysis).
326
327
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for example, immigration raids have devastated employers, the wellbeing of small towns, and the economic well-being of the entire
nation .332 The reality is that immigrant workers dominate certain
industries, including agriculture and meatpacking plants like that of
Swift & Co. "Ridding" the country of twelve million undocumented
workers through raids is not only unrealistic but incredibly disruptive.
These raids also significantly undermine the rights of all workers.
Unfortunately, the vulnerability of undocumented workers and their
diminished labor protections render them vulnerable to employers or
even employees who might report them to immigration in order to
undermine efforts to improve their working conditions. 333 Further,
these raids and the ensuing dearth of workers in certain communities
have been so disruptive that communities have devised ill-conceived
strategies that further undermine workplace rights. In Colorado, for
example, as immigrant workers are arrested or leave because of the
state's anti-immigration ordinances, the state has instituted a program
to permit low-risk inmates to harvest the crops, replacing migrant
workers in the fields. 334 Under the program, farmers pay a fee to the
states in exchange for the work of volunteer inmates, who are paid
about sixty cents a day. 335 This prison program has precedents in
Arizona where last year, about sixty prisoners worked in watermelon
fields , replacing migrant workers. 336 Other states facing similar labor
shortages, including Iowa, are considering similar measures. 337 The
cynicism embodied in these proposals is that the very same
undocumented
workers arrested by the immigration raids and
subsequently charged with identity theft crimes could end up being
the very ones who fill these jobs as prisoners, especially given the
rising statistics of immigrants imprisoned for immigration crimes.
Likewise , home raids invade the most intimate sphere of privacy
protection under the Fourth Amendment.
In the home , privacy is
conceptualized as a form of intimacy; the home is a space where
privacy is not just essential to individual self-creation , but also to
332
See Jennifer Talhelm , Senators Question Immigration Raids Against Meatpacker,
POST-INDEP. (Denver, Colo .), Jan . 22, 2007 , available at http://cbs4d enver.com/
politics/local _story _023 l 02531 .html.
333
See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 346-48
(2001 ).
334
Dan Frosch, Inmates Will Replace Wary Migrants in Colorado Fields, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2007, at Al.
33s Id.
336 Id.
331 Id.
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human relationships, including families. 338 The immigration raids
executed in people 's homes during the early hours of the day
purposefully target entire families and small enclaves of immigrant
communities that have chosen to share the intimate space of mutual
residence .
Here , citizens and noncitizens coexist and relate to one another in
the most intimate of spaces. There is no ongoing criminal activity
inside the home , other than the constructed illegality of one or a few
of the residents . During the raids, most residents are getting up ,
preparing to commence their days, to have breakfast, to go to school ,
or to work. True, some arrests must occur in the home . However ,
these should be restricted in scope to safeguard intimacy by only
allowing for the arrest of the warrant's actual target and only when
immigration agents have reasonable grounds for believing the target
still lives in the home .
CONCLUSION

The UC Davis School of Law's Symposium , titled "Katz v. U.S.: 40
Years Later ," for which I write this Article, turned out to be more a
reflection about the failing of Katz or its unfulfilled promise , rather
than a celebration. Part Jof the explanation lies in Katz's inherent
doctrinal flaws, but also in the subsequent distortion of the doctrine .
We can blame technological advancements, for example , for some of
the distortion, but beyond that , this immigration case study reveals the
intolerance for recognizing the privacy expectations of "undesirable "
persons or act1v1t1es. Such has been the case in the constructed
"illegality " of immigrants, which has had a corrosive effect on privacy,
including in spaces such as the home, where citizens still receive
heightened privacy protection.
The web of Fourth Amendment
doctrines that undermine privacy protections for immigrants is more
complex than the effect of Katz alone . However, Katz plays a central
role . Immigrants ' attributed "blame " for crossing the border or
overstaying their visas render them undeserving of an expectation of
privacy in the spaces they occupy in the United States. This blame
justifies the proliferation of immigration databases , the issuance of
general and defective warrants based on such databases , and the
dragnet-like and discriminatory enforcement of administrative
warrants. But is this right? Was the Fourth Amendment intended to
protect solely the so-called innocent? Or was its purpose to curtail
abuses of policing powers , particularly against vulnerable groups?
338

Solove, supra note 328, at 1121.
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Courts must reconsider these questions as they examine the legality of
the current raids .

